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The development of quantum computers presents a threat to the security of modern
communication systems; with Shor’s algorithm, all currently used asymmetric
cryptography schemes can be broken. Fortunately, secure communication is still
possible in the post-quantum era using symmetric encryption algorithms, such
as the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) or the provably secure one-time
pad (OTP). However, the main problem of symmetric cryptography, the key
distribution, has to be solved.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) uses the fundamental properties of quantum
mechanics to distribute encryption keys in a provably secure manner. In this
thesis, the practical applicability of QKD is examined. This is achieved by testing
the performance, stability, and usability of one of the few commercially available
QKD platforms, ID Quantique’s Clavis 2.
The tested system was stable for multiple months in normal operation and did
not require any intervention from the user. The maximum distance with the
test platform was 54 km. However, at these distances, the secret key rate was
only tens of bits per second. For distances below 25 km, secret key rates in the
kilobits per second range were achieved. Thus, if high data rates or communication
distances close to 50 km are desired, ciphers less secure than OTP have to be
used. Additionally, two ﬂaws were discovered in the tested system, one making
the system unstable, and the other preventing the key distribution process from
starting. Fortunately, neither issue reduces the security of the system, and both
could be ﬁxed by modifying the software. Our results show that QKD can be
considered as a mature technology that is ready for practical applications and
even for commercial use.
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Kvanttitietokoneiden tuleva kehitys muodostaa uhan nykyaikaisten viestintäjärjes-
telmien ja tallennetun digitaalisen tiedon turvallisuudelle; kaikki nykyisin käytet-
tävät epäsymmetriset salausjärjestelmät pystytään murtamaan Shorin algoritmilla.
Turvallinen viestintä on kuitenkin edelleen mahdollista käyttämällä symmetrisiä
salausalgoritmeja, joita ovat esimerkiksi Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) ja
todistettavasti turvallinen one-time pad (OTP). Symmetrisen salauksen pääongel-
ma, avaimien jakaminen, vaatii kuitenkin uuden teknisen ratkaisun.
Kvanttiavainjakelu (QKD) käyttää kvanttimekaniikan perusominaisuuksia salausa-
vaimien todistettavasti turvalliseen jakamiseen. Tässä diplomityössä arvioidaan
QKD:n käytännön soveltuvuutta sen nykyisessä tilassa. Tämä saavutetaan testaa-
malla kaupallisen QKD-alustan, ID Quantiquen Clavis2:n, suorituskykyä, vakautta
ja käytettävyyttä.
Tuloksien perusteella voidaan todeta, että QKD on toimiva teknologia ja valmis
käytännön sovelluksiin. Testattu järjestelmä oli stabiili pitkiä aikoja normaalissa
käytössä eikä vaatinut toimenpiteitä käyttäjältä. Vaikka pisin saavutettu etäisyys
testatulla alustalla oli 54 km, oli avainnopeus näillä etäisyyksillä kymmeniä bittejä
sekunnissa. Alle 25 km:n etäisyyksille saavutettiin kilobittien avainnopeuksia.
Jos halutaan korkeita tiedonsiirtonopeuksia tai pitkiä viestintäetäisyyksiä, täytyy
käyttää OTP:tä vähemmän turvallisia salausjärjestelmiä. Testatusta järjestelmästä
löydettiin lisäksi kaksi vikaa, joista ensimmäinen teki järjestelmästä epävakaan ja
toinen esti avainjakoprosessin aloittamisen. Kumpikaan ongelma ei kuitenkaan
vähennä järjestelmän turvallisuutta, ja molemmat voidaan korjata tekemällä pieniä
muutoksia systeemin ohjelmistoon.
Avainsanat: Kvanttiavainjakelu, QKD, Kryptograﬁa, Kvantti-informaatio
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Symbols
aˆ Annihilation operator
aˆ† Creation operator
Aˆ, Bˆ, Oˆ Hermitian operators of observables A, B, and O
Aω,ω′ SARG04 sifting pair
B Bandwidth limit
f Universal2 hash function
Hbin Binary entropy
IBob Bob’s information
IEve Eve’s information
I1, I2 Intensities at detectors 1 and 2
l Fiber length
ld Delay line length
lm Authentication message length
lt Authentication tag length
N Block size
Nd Number of bits disclose during error correction
Nf Final key size
Ns Sifted key size
n Number of photons; Number of bits
p Probability of choosing the X basis
pc Probability of a conclusive measurement result
pdark Probability of a dark count in Bob’s detector
pdet Probability of detection
pn(µ) Poissonian distribution
Pˆx Projection operator onto subspace orthogonal to |−z〉
Pˆz Projection operator onto subspace orthogonal to |−x〉
Q Quantum bit error rate
Qdet Quantum bit error rate caused by dark counts
Qopt Quantum bit error rate caused by optical misalignment
Q′
√
Q(1−Q)
t Transmittance; Authentication tag
tc Crash time
ted Number of bits disclosed through eavesdropping
tec Number of bits disclosed during error correction
Uˆ Unitary operator
r Final key size
V Visibility
Xˆ1, Xˆ2 Quadratures of coherent light
Ys, Yd Signal and decoy state yields
β Fiber attenuation per kilometer
viii
δn,m Kronecker delta
ηd Detection eﬃciency
µ Mean photon number
ν Duty cycle
ρˆ Density matrix
φA Alice’s phase shift
φB Bob’s phase shift
|n〉 Fock state
|t〉 Target state
|±x〉 Basis vectors of the X basis
|±z〉 Basis vectors of the Z basis
|α〉 Coherent state
|ϕ〉 , |ψ〉 Arbitrary state vectors
|↑〉 , |↓〉 Spin up and down states
|l〉 , |↔〉 Rectilinear polarization basis states
| ↔〉, |↔ 〉 Diagonal polarization basis states
⊕ Bitwise exclusive or
Abbreviations
APD Avalanche photo diode
COW Coherent one way
DPS Diﬀerential phase shift
FWHM Full width at half maximum
LDPC Low-density parity-check
OPT One-time-pad
PNS Photon number splitting
QBER Quantum bit error rate
QKD Quantum key distribution
WDM Wavelength-division multiplexing
11 Introduction
Until recently, the applications of cryptography, the science of secure transmission of
messages, has mostly been limited to military and state level applications. However,
with the rise of the internet, cryptography has attained a signiﬁcant role in the
every day life of ordinary people securing, for example, private messaging, personal
information, and online banking.
The general setting of cryptography, using the established place holder names,
is the following; Alice and Bob wish to communicate securely with each other, and
an eavesdropper, Eve, attempts to intercept this communication in order to obtain
information or to manipulate the contents of their messages. To prevent Eve’s
intentions, Alice combines her message with a secret key through some mathematical
manipulation, producing an encrypted message. After receiving the encrypted mes-
sage, Bob decrypts it using his key and the appropriate mathematical manipulation.
In an ideal case, Eve can only access the encrypted message and cannot obtain any
information about the contents of the original message, since she does not possess
the secret key.
Cryptography can be divided roughly into two subsets, which are called symmetric
and asymmetric, based on the relation between Alice’s and Bob’s keys. In symmetric
cryptography, the same key is used for both encrypting and decrypting the message.
An example of a symmetric cryptography scheme is the one-time-pad (OTP), where
each bit of the message is combined with the key using bitwise exclusive-or operation.
This produces an absolutely secure encrypted message [1] as long as the length of
the key is equal or greater than the length of the original message and each key
is used only once. The security is guaranteed by the fact that any message can
produce any encrypted message when combined with the appropriate key. Due to the
aforementioned limitations of OTP, more practical, the so-called block ciphers, such as
AES-256 [2], the current de facto symmetric encryption standard, are used. Although
more than one message can be encrypted using the same key with these more complex
ciphers, the frequent changing of the encryption key is still recommended to maximize
security. The fundamental problem with symmetric cryptography is the distribution
of keys; when there is no secure connection between Alice and Bob, there is no way
for them to eﬃciently share secret keys using classical communication. In critical
applications, this can be, and has been circumvented by using physical means, such
as couriers, for distributing the keys. However, this is ineﬃcient and cumbersome.
Until now, the problem of key distribution has been solved by using asymmetric
cryptography. In asymmetric cryptography, Bob generates a pair of keys, a public
and a private key. The public key can be distributed freely, while Bob keeps the
private key to himself. When Alice wishes to send a message to Bob, she encrypts her
message using Bob’s public key, after which the message can only be decrypted using
Bob’s private key. The security of asymmetric cryptography clearly relies on the
process by which the key pair is produced to be diﬃcult to reverse; even if someone
knows the public key, they can not produce the private key and decrypt the message.
Usually this property is achieved by using large prime numbers and the factorization
of their product, discrete logarithms, or the properties of elliptic curves. All of
2these problems are computationally diﬃcult to reverse using classical computers.
However, encrypting and decrypting messages using asymmetric cryptography is also
computationally intensive and not usually viable with modern data rates. Therefore,
the so-called session keys are frequently used, where a secret key is distributed
between the parties using asymmetric cryptography, and the actual data is encrypted
using symmetric cryptography and the shared secret key.
Although asymmetric cryptography algorithms are secure against attacks using
classical computers, quantum computers present a new threat to all of these schemes.
Using Shor’s algorithm, a quantum computer can break all current asymmetric
cryptography algorithms in polynomial time [3]. However, it should be noted that a
quantum computer with enough qubits to break any actual cryptography algorithm
has not yet been built. To counter this threat, new post-quantum cryptography
schemes that are immune to Shor’s algorithm have been proposed. However, these
new algorithms still rely on computational complexity to ensure their security and are,
therefore, vulnerable to unexpected advances in computational science or mathematics
[4].
Since symmetric encryption algorithms are immune to Shor’s algorithm, another
solution for secure communication in the post-quantum era is to move to purely sym-
metric cryptography. Although a proposed search algorithm for quantum computers,
Grover’s algorithm [5], can signiﬁcantly speed up the cracking of block ciphers, this
can be eﬃciently countered with the use of longer keys [4]. Nevertheless, when
maximum security is required, OTP should be used as the encryption algorithm.
However, as stated above, the use of symmetric cryptography requires an eﬃcient
method of distributing encryption keys between Alice and Bob. This problem can be
solved with quantum key distribution (QKD), which uses the fundamental properties
of quantum mechanics to oﬀer an information theoretically secure way of distributing
secret keys between two parties.
The main objective of this thesis is to assess the practical applicability of QKD
at its current state. For the testing, one of the few commercially available QKD
platforms, ID Quantique’s Clavis2, is used. In addition to security, the most signiﬁcant
criteria for any practical QKD system are performance, stability, and usability; the
platform should be able to continuously and without user intervention provide secret
keys at a rate that is suﬃcient for encryption using either AES or, more ideally, OTP.
The structure of this thesis is the following. In the ﬁrst section, the fundamental
properties of quantum mechanics are introduced on the level that is relevant to
quantum key distribution and this thesis. Next, the basic idea and required steps of
QKD are described, which is complemented with ways of realizing QKD in practice
and the most relevant protocols in the following two sections. In the experimental
part of the thesis, the testing methodology and the results are described and discussed.
Lastly, the thesis is concluded with the most signiﬁcant ﬁndings.
32 Some Aspects of Quantum Mechanics
This section is a brief introduction to the fundamental properties and notation of
quantum mechanics on the level that is needed for understanding quantum key
distribution in the scope of this thesis.
2.1 States, Superposition and Measurement
According to the postulates of quantum mechanics, a closed system, which can be a
single particle or a collection of particles, can be represented as a state vector |ψ〉 in
an N dimensional Hilbert space, and this state vector contains all the information
that can be known about the system. Furthermore, every observable, i.e. measurable
physical quantity, is represented by a Hermitian operator, and the only possible
results of the measurement are the eigenvalues ok of this operator:
Oˆ |φk〉 = ok |φk〉 . (1)
Here Oˆ is a Hermitian operator of an observable O, |φk〉 is its eigenstate, and ok is
an eigenvalue that corresponds to this eigenstate. Additionally, since the operator Oˆ
is Hermitian, the eigenvalues {ok}Nk=1 are always real. Furthermore, the eigenstates
{|φk〉}Nk=1 of a Hermitian operator form a complete orthonormal basis, i.e. their inner
product follows
〈φk|φl〉 = δk,l, (2)
assuming that the state vectors |φk〉 are normalized to unity:
〈φk|φk〉 = 1. (3)
Thus, any state |ψ〉 can be represented as a superposition of the eigenstates of an
observable:
|ψ〉 =∑
k
|φk〉 〈φk|ψ〉 =
∑
k
ck |φk〉 . (4)
Here ck = 〈φk|ψ〉 are constants that project the state |ψ〉 onto the eigenstates |φk〉.
The squares of the absolute values of these constants, |ck|2, are the probabilities of a
measurement of O yielding the result ok.
After a measurement, that yields the result ok, the system is left in the eigenstate
|φk〉. This is usually referred to as the collapse of the state. Thus, if the same
observable is measured again, the result is the same value ok. This follows directly
from Equations (3) and (4). However, the eigenstate |φk〉 can also be represented as
a superposition of the eigenstates {|αi〉}Ni=1 of some other observable A:
|φk〉 =
∑
i
|αi〉 〈αi|φk〉 =
∑
i
bi |αi〉 . (5)
Thus, if A is measured after the ﬁrst measurement of O, the state collapses again, this
time into an eigenstate |αi〉 of the operator Aˆ. This state is in turn a superposition
of the eigenstates {|φk〉}Nk=1 of the observable O, and a new measurement of O can
4yield any of the eigenvalues ok as a result. In other words, the pure act of measuring
A added uncertainty to the value of O.
This collapsing of states into an eigenstate of the observable being measured,
described above, is the source for the Heisenberg uncertainty principle, which states
in its most general form that the uncertainties ∆A and ∆B of observables A and B
follow the equation
∆A∆B ≥ 1
2
〈[Aˆ, Bˆ]〉. (6)
Here [Aˆ, Bˆ] is the commutator of the operators Aˆ and Bˆ:
[Aˆ, Bˆ] = AˆBˆ − BˆAˆ, (7)
and 〈[Aˆ, Bˆ]〉 is the expectation value of the operator [Aˆ, Bˆ], which for state |ψ〉, is
〈[Aˆ, Bˆ]〉 = 〈ψ|[Aˆ, Bˆ]|ψ〉 . (8)
It can also be seen from Equation (6) that if operators Aˆ and Bˆ commute, i.e.
[Aˆ, Bˆ] = 0, the uncertainty of both observables A and B can be zero at the same
time, or in other words, both quantities can be known accurately at the same time.
This is due to the fact that if two operators commute, they have a complete set
of common eigenstates. Therefore, if A is measured and the state of the system
collapses into an eigenstate of Aˆ, it is possible that this state is also an eigenstate
of Bˆ. Therefore, when B is measured, the state does not collapse further, since it
already is an eigenstate of Bˆ. This way, the value of both A and B can be known
accurately by using successive measurements.
2.2 No Cloning
For cloning of a state to be possible in quantum mechanics, there should exist a
unitary operator Uˆ that can copy any state to the target state |t〉. Therefore, when
applied to states |ψ〉 and |ϕ〉, the result must be
Uˆ |ψ〉 |t〉 = |ψ〉 |ψ〉 , (9)
Uˆ |ϕ〉 |t〉 = |ϕ〉 |ϕ〉 . (10)
Since Uˆ is unitary, Uˆ †Uˆ = 1ˆ, where 1ˆ is the identity operator. Taking the inner
product of the states after cloning, equations (9) and (10) imply that
〈ϕ| 〈ϕ|ψ〉 |ψ〉 = 〈ϕ| 〈t| Uˆ †Uˆ |ψ〉 |t〉 (11)
(〈ϕ|ψ〉)2 = 〈ϕ| 〈t| |ψ〉 |t〉 (12)
(〈ϕ|ψ〉)2 = 〈ϕ|ψ〉 〈t|t〉 (13)
(〈ϕ|ψ〉)2 = 〈ϕ|ψ〉 . (14)
This is only possible if 〈ϕ|ψ〉 = 0 or 〈ϕ|ψ〉 = 1. Thus, cloning is possible only if |ψ〉
and |ϕ〉 are the same state or orthogonal states, and cloning of any arbitrary state is
not possible.
53 Fundamentals of Quantum Key Distribution
This section introduces the basic steps of quantum key distribution. First, the BB84
protocol is presented to describe the general idea behind QKD and show how quantum
mechanics ensures its security. In the following sections, the required classical data
processing steps, error correction, privacy ampliﬁcation, and authentication, are
introduced. Lastly, diﬀerent attack strategies against the BB84 protocol and their
eﬀects are discussed.
As is customary in cryptography, place holder names are used in the following
sections in the following fashion; Alice and Bob are trying to communicate securely
with each other, while Eve is trying to eavesdrop on their communication. Addition-
ally, Alice and Bob have two communication channels, one channel for transmitting
photons, which is usually referred to as the quantum channel, and one for classical
communications, called classical channel. The quantum channel is usually imple-
mented using either an optical ﬁber or a free space link, while any means of classical
communication can be used for the classical channel. Furthermore, it is assumed
that Eve can freely eavesdrop on all communication in both channels as long as she
follows the laws of physics.
3.1 Steps
This section introduces the steps that Alice and Bob have to take in order to obtain
a shared sequence of secret bits using quantum key distribution. These steps and
their order are presented in Figure 1. BB84 is used as an example of a QKD protocol
due to its historical importance and simplicity.
Raw key exchange
Sifting
QBER
Error correction
Privacy ampliﬁcation
Authentication
Cryptography
Disclosed bits
Raw key
Sifted key
Corrected key
Secret key
Figure 1: Steps of quantum key distribution.
63.1.1 Raw Key Exchange Using BB84
Originally introduced by Bennett and Brassard in 1984 [6], BB84 is the oldest
quantum key distribution protocol, and it was ﬁrst experimentally demonstrated
by Bennett and Bessette et al. in 1992 [7]. The protocol uses two complementary
bases in a two-dimensional Hilbert space to ensure secure key distribution [6]. If the
orthonormal basis vectors of the ﬁrst basis, called X basis, are |−x〉 and |+x〉, the
basis vectors of the second basis, called Z basis, are
|±z〉 = 1√
2
(|+x〉 ± |−x〉) . (15)
Naturally, the same applies vice versa
|±x〉 = 1√
2
(|+z〉 ± |−z〉) . (16)
These relations are visualized in Figure 2. Additionally, for practical implementation
to be possible, there must exist a measurement for both bases that can unambiguously
discriminate between the two basis states.
|+x〉
|−x〉
|+z〉
|−z〉
Figure 2: Visualization of the BB84 basis vectors.
Alice starts the protocol by preparing n photons and measuring an observable
of each photon. Alice and Bob have agreed before hand what observable they use
for their measurements. For each measurement, she chooses randomly either the
X or Z basis, and both bases must have equal probability of being chosen. If the
measurement result is −x or −z, Alice assigns the photon a classical bit value 0, and
if the result is +x or +z, the bit value is 1. After each measurement, Alice sends the
photon to Bob, who also measures the observable in a random basis and assigns each
photon a bit value using the same rules as Alice. This phase is usually referred to as
7the raw key exchange, and the obtained key is the raw key. In cases where Bob’s
random basis choice is the same as Alice’s, their measurement results, and therefore
their bit values, must match. This is guaranteed by the laws of quantum mechanics.
However, when Bob measures the observable in diﬀerent basis from Alice, there is
only a 50% chance that they obtain the same bit value, because the basis vectors of
the basis X are equal superposition states in the basis Z and vice versa. Therefore,
after Bob has received and measured all photons, Alice and Bob compare publicly
their basis choices using the classical channel and discard any results where they used
diﬀerent bases for their measurements, because in these cases there is no correlation
between their bit values. [6] This is usually referred to as the sifting phase, and the
key that is obtained after this step is the sifted key. In the absence of eavesdropping
or any other error sources, Alice and Bob have now a shared sequence of bits that
they can use as an encryption key. An example of this process is presented in Table 1
for 8 photons.
Table 1: An example of the key distribution using the BB84 protocol.
Alice’s state |+x〉 |−z〉 |+x〉 |−x〉 |+x〉 |−z〉 |−z〉 |−z〉
Alice’s bit 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
Bob’s state |+x〉 |+x〉 |−z〉 |−x〉 |+x〉 |+x〉 |−x〉 |−z〉
Bob’s bit 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0
Compatibility X × × X X × × X
Sifted key 1 0 1 0
3.1.2 Eavesdropping
The security of the BB84 protocol relies on the fact that Eve does not know the
bases that Alice used while detecting her photons, and the only thing Eve can do is
just to make a guess. If her guess is incorrect, and she measures the observable in
diﬀerent basis from Alice, she obtains the correct bit value with a 50% probability.
Additionally, she alters the state of the photon, because her measurement causes
the state to collapse to the eigenstate corresponding to her measurement result.
On the other hand, if her measurement destroys the photon, the best Eve can do
is to prepare a new photon in the same state as the one she measured and send
the new photon to Bob. This most basic type of attack is usually referred to as
intercept-resend. Now, due to the eavesdropping, the photon is in an eigenstate
of the complementary basis of the basis chosen by Alice. Thus, there is a 50%
probability that Bob’s bit value is diﬀerent from Alice’s, when their basis choices
match, as visualized in Figure 3. Here, only the case where Alice’s and Bob’s basis
choices match is considered, because otherwise the bit value is discarded in the sifting
phase. On the other hand, if Eve’s guess about the measurement basis is correct, she
obtains the correct bit value without altering the state of the photon. [6] It should
be noted that after her measurement, Eve can not know whether her basis choice
was correct or not. This she can determine only in the sifting phase, when Alice and
8Bob compare their basis choices publicly.
Overall, there is a 75% probability that Eve can obtain a single bit value without
it being detected by Alice and Bob. However, when using n bits, the probability of
Alice and Bob detecting the eavesdropping is 1−
(
3
4
)n
, if Eve eavesdrops on every
photon.
|−x〉
"0"
|−x〉
"0"
|−x〉
"0"
|−z〉
"0"
|+z〉
"1"
|−x〉
"0"
|+x〉
"1"
|−x〉
"0"
|+x〉
"1"
X1/2
Z
1/2 1/4
1/4
1/2
1/8
1/8
1/8
1/8
Alice Eve Bob
Figure 3: An example of eavesdropping in BB84. In cases mark with red, eavesdrop-
ping causes an error and can be detected.
To detect the errors caused by Eve’s eavesdropping, Alice and Bob have to
compare some fraction of their sifted keys. Because there is no encrypted connection
yet, this comparison has to be done publicly using the classical channel. Therefore,
the bits used for the comparison must be discarded to minimize Eve’s information
about the key. If the percentage of bits with errors, i.e. the quantum bit error rate
(QBER), is below a certain threshold, which is discussed in detail in Section 3.2,
Alice and Bob can be sure that the amount of information Eve has about the bit
sequence is low enough that they can continue with the protocol. Otherwise, the
bit sequence has to be discarded and the key distribution started again from the
beginning. [6]
3.1.3 Error Correction
Regardless of the exact protocols used for QKD, there are bound to be errors in the
sifted key shared between Alice and Bob. These errors can be caused by eavesdropping
or physical error sources. Therefore, some error correction scheme has to be used
9in order to guarantee that Alice’s and Bob’s keys are identical and can be used for
encryption.
Because there is no secure connection between Alice and Bob, the error correction
has to be done publicly in the classical channel, and Eve can use this communication
to obtain additional information about the key. Therefore, the error correction used
has to be as eﬃcient as possible, i.e. the amount of information Alice must send to
Bob per bit should be as close as possible to the so-called Shannon limit. This limit
is given by Hbin(Q), where Q is the QBER and Hbin is the binary entropy:
Hbin(Q) = −Q log2(Q)− (1−Q) log2(1−Q). (17)
Because of this, an error correction algorithm, called Cascade, was developed to be
used with QKD.
In Cascade, Alice and Bob ﬁrst agree on a permutation that they apply on their
sifted keys. Next, the key is divided into blocks, where the block size is chosen by
Alice and Bob, and the optimal size depends of the QBER. Alice computes the bit
parity of each block and sends the parities to Bob. Bob checks whether the parities
of his blocks match the ones sent by Alice, and for each block with parity mismatch
Alice and Bob perform an interactive binary search to ﬁnd and correct the error. [8]
In interactive binary search, the block is split into two halves. Alice computes
the parity of the ﬁrst half, and and Bob checks if the parity of his corresponding half
matches. If the parity does not match, the error is in the ﬁrst half. Otherwise, the
error is in the second half. This splitting and parity checking is repeated until the
error is found and corrected. [8]
After the ﬁrst pass, Alice and Bob have the same parity for each block, and
therefore each block has an even number of, or zero, errors. Now, they reverse their
previous permutation, apply a new one, double the blocks size, and repeat the parity
check and interactive binary search for the new blocks. This process is repeated over
multiple passes. Additionally, when an error is corrected during a pass, this changes
the parity of the blocks that the corrected bit was part of in the previous passes.
Alice and Bob can use this to correct errors in these blocks using interactive binary
search, which again changes parities of other blocks in other passes. This iterative
process is repeated until the parities of all of the blocks in all of the passes match. [8]
If the parity of a block matches between Alice and Bob, the amount of disclosed
bits is 1. However, if the parity does not match and binary search has to be used, a
block of size N has to be split into halves log2(N) times before the error is found,
and each time the parity of one half in disclosed. Therefore, the amount of disclosed
bits is log2(N) + 1 for blocks with parity mismatch.
While Cascade is easy to implement and rather eﬃcient, it is highly interactive,
i.e. it requires large amounts of messages between Alice and Bob. This can reduce
the secret key rate of the system signiﬁcantly when the latency of the classical
channel is high. This interactivity can be reduced to a single message by using
low-density parity-check (LDPC) codes. Furthermore, these codes can even be made
more eﬃcient than Cascade [9]. However, diﬀerent LDPC codes have to be used for
diﬀerent QBER values.
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3.1.4 Privacy Amplification
As was described in the previous sections, Eve can obtain some information about
the secret bit sequence by eavesdropping on the quantum channel during the key
distribution phase or by listening to the classical channel during the error correction
phase. Therefore, after they have corrected any discrepancies in their sequences,
Alice and Bob have to use some scheme to minimize Eve’s information about the
key. This step is usually referred to as privacy ampliﬁcation.
Eve’s information about the key in bits, t, consists of the bits she obtained by
eavesdropping on the quantum channel ted and the bits Alice and Bob disclosed
during error correction tec. The former can be estimated from the QBER, while
the latter can be calculated during the error correction phase as described in the
previous section.
If Alice and Bob knew of which physical bits of the key Eve has full information
about, they could simply discard these bits from the secret key, and the ﬁnal key
length would be n−t. However, because Eve’s eavesdropping on the quantum channel
produces an error with probability 1/4, Alice and Bob can identify only a fraction
of the bits that were leaked. Furthermore, the information that Eve can obtain by
listening to the public channel during error correction is spread over multiple bits as
parity information. Therefore, Alice and Bob must use universal2 hash functions in
order to generate a shorter key and minimize Eve’s information. If Alice and Bob
discard s < n− t additional bits and use a random function from a class of universal2
hash functions, which map the length n bit sequence into a length r = n− t− s bit
sequence, Eve’s expected information about the new shorter key is [10]
IEve ≤ 2
−s
ln 2
. (18)
This process is visualized in Figure 4.
n
tedtec
t
sr
Figure 4: Key usage in privacy ampliﬁcation.
3.1.5 Authentication
After all of the aforementioned steps, Alice and Bob ﬁnally share an identical key,
and Eve’s information about this key has been minimized. The ﬁnal step is to
authenticate that the parties that have shared the key are actually Alice and Bob.
Without any authentication, Eve could impersonate Bob to Alice and vice versa,
sharing one secret key with Alice and another one with Bob, as depicted in Figure 5.
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Figure 5: Visualization of the man-in-the-middle attack.
In this scheme, usually called man-in-the-middle attack, Eve can access, and even
modify, all of the information that is exchanged between Alice and Bob while they
are under the impression that their communication is secured.
To authenticate their key exchange, Alice creates a message m of length lm and a
so-called authentication tag t of length lt and sends them to Bob. The generation
of this tag requires Alice and Bob to share a sequence of secret bits. The ﬁrst part
of the secret is used to specify a function f in a class of universal2 functions that
maps the message m from length lm to length lt, and the result is combined with the
remaining part of the secret, b, using bitwise exclusive or: [11]
t = f(m)⊕ b (19)
To authenticate that the message was sent by Alice, Bob needs to conduct the same
process on the message m received from Alice and verify that the result is the same
as the tag t sent by Alice, as visualized in Figure 6. Additionally, Bob has to create
a new message and authentication tag and send them to Alice in order to let her
authenticate their key exchange.
Alice Bob
Message m
Tag t
f(m)⊕ b
m from Alice
f(m)⊕ bt from Alice =
Figure 6: The authentication process.
If Alice and Bob have already shared secret keys during previous rounds of QKD,
parts of these keys can be used as the secret needed for authentication. However,
after the ﬁrst key exchange, Alice and Bob have no shared secret keys to use for the
authentication of their communication. Therefore, they must share an initial secret
even before the key exchange begins. Furthermore, Eve could conduct the man-in-
the-middle attack during the key exchange phase and forward the authentication
messages between Alice and Bob during the authentication phase. To counter this,
Alice and Bob have to use some data from their communication during the key
distribution in the authentication message in order to ensure that the secret key is
actually shared between them.
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3.2 Attacks
As was discussed in Section 3.1.2, the security of QKD relies on the fact that any
eavesdropping can be detected as errors in the bit sequence shared between Alice and
Bob, and these errors can be quantiﬁed using the quantum bit error rate. Furthermore,
eﬃcient use of privacy ampliﬁcation requires that Alice and Bob can reliably estimate
the amount of information Eve has obtained about the sifted key. In order to estimate
the maximum amount of information Eve can obtain while causing a certain QBER
value, diﬀerent eavesdropping strategies have to be analyzed.
In so-called individual attacks, Eve can only measure the state of each photon
Alice sends to Bob independently, and this measurement has to be done before the
classical data processing steps, i.e. error correction and privacy ampliﬁcation. An
example of such an attack is the aforementioned intercept-resend. [12] The maximum
amount of information Eve can obtain per bit by using this type of attack is [13]
IEve = 1−Hbin
(
1
2
+Q′
)
. (20)
Here, Hbin(Q) is the binary entropy, deﬁned in Equation (17), and Q
′ =
√
Q(1−Q),
where Q is the QBER. This can be expressed in the form
IEve =
1
ln 4
[
4Q′ tanh−1(2Q′) + ln
(
1− 4Q′2
)]
, (21)
and for a small QBER this simpliﬁes to
IEve ≈ 2
ln 2
Q ≈ 2.89Q. (22)
Therefore, the amount of bits Eve has obtained by eavesdropping, ted, when Alice
has sent n photons, is approximately
ted = IEven ≈ 2.89Qn. (23)
On the other hand, Bob’s information per bit is given by
IBob = 1−Hbin(Q). (24)
These two curves are depicted in Figure 7. In order to correct the errors in Bob’s key
using an ideal error correction algorithm, 1− IBob = Hbin(Q) bits of information has
to be disclosed per bit, as discussed in Section 3.1.3. This is the area above the IBob
curve in the ﬁgure. Additionally, Eve has obtained IEve bits of information about
the raw key per bit. Therefore, the maximum fraction of the raw key that Alice and
Bob can use for the secret key is IBob − IEve, i.e. the area between the two curves.
Thus, the generation of a secret key becomes impossible after the point at which
these two curves cross, i.e. Q ≈ 0.147.
With collective attacks, Eve is still restricted to measuring each photon inde-
pendently. However, now she is allowed to measure her probes that have interacted
with the photons after the classical data processing steps. This way she can use any
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Figure 7: Information of Bob and Eve as functions of the QBER for an individual
attack.
information she may obtain from, for example, the messages encrypted with the key
to choose the best possible measurement. [12]
The most general class of attacks Eve can use are called coherent attacks, where in
addition to the methods stated above, she is also allowed to use coherent measurements
of multiple photons. This may give an advantage to Eve, because when the key is
shortened during the privacy ampliﬁcation phase, the ﬁnal key is actually determined
by the relations between diﬀerent bits. [12] If Eve’s arsenal of attacks is extended to
include coherent attacks, it can be shown that Eve’s maximum information per bit
is given by [12, 14]
IEve = Hbin(Q). (25)
Therefore, the generation of a secure key is possible when Bob’s information is larger
than Eve’s
1−Hbin(Q) > Hbin(Q). (26)
This gives the bound Q . 0.11 for the unconditional security of BB84.
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4 Practical Implementation
In the previous section, quantum key distribution was introduced in the ideal case.
However, when QKD is implemented in practical scenarios, non-ideal components
have to be used, and the properties of these components must be taken into account.
In this section, we discuss the eﬀects of these factors on the performance and security
of practical QKD systems.
4.1 Single Photon Sources
The ideal implementation of BB84 requires Alice to be able to prepare and measure
states that consist of single photons. A practical single photon source should have a
low probability of emitting pulses with more than one photon and high eﬃciency, i.e.
triggering should lead to photon emission with a high probability. Furthermore, the
spectral width of the emitted photons should be narrow and the wavelength should
be either in the O-band (1310 nm) or more preferably in the C-band (1550 nm) to
ensure low losses with modern telecommunication optical ﬁbers. Lastly, all of these
requirements should be fulﬁlled close to room temperature in order for the source to
be usable in practical QKD systems.
Although single photon sources have been implemented using quantum dots [15],
diamond color centers [16], and single atoms [17], none of these techniques have
fulﬁlled all of the aforementioned requirements. Because of these diﬃculties, highly
attenuated lasers are the most common photon sources used for practical QKD. A
pulse of light emitted by a laser is best described by a coherent state
|α〉 = e−|α|2/2
∞∑
n=0
αn√
n!
|n〉 . (27)
Here α =
√
µeiθ, where µ is the mean photon number of a pulse and θ deﬁnes the
phase. Furthermore, |n〉 is a Fock state, also referred to as number state, which
contains n photons. Since with QKD there is no reference phase for the laser outside
of Alice’s device, the state is actually a mixed state with a random phase, represented
by a density matrix ρˆ
ρˆ =
1
2π
∫ 2pi
0
|α〉 〈α| dθ. (28)
In other words, with mean photon number µ = |α|2, the probability pn(µ) of a pulse
containing n photons is given by the Poissonian distribution
pn(µ) = e
−µµ
n
n!
. (29)
This distribution is presented in Figure 8 for mean photon numbers µ = 0.1, 0.5, 1.
To best mimic pure single photon pulses and minimize the probability of a pulse
containing multiple photons, coherent states must be attenuated so that µ≪ 1. This
has the signiﬁcant drawback that most pulses actually contain zero photons and are
not usable for key distribution, which signiﬁcantly reduces the secret key rate.
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Figure 8: Probabilities of a coherent pulse containing n photons for three diﬀerent
mean photon numbers.
4.2 Single Photon Detectors
The most important ﬁgures of merit of a single photon detector in QKD are the
quantum eﬃciency, the probability that when a photon hits the detector, the detector
is triggered, the dark count rate, the amount of false detections per unit time, dead
time, the minimum amount of time between two detections [12], and jitter, the time
between the absorption of a photon and a detection signal [13]. Additionally, like a
the single photon source, the detector should operate near to room temperature to
be usable in practical QKD systems.
Avalanche photo diodes (APDs) are the most practical option for single photon
detection in QKD. Usually, APDs are operated in the so-called Geiger mode, where
a voltage exceeding the breakdown voltage is applied to the diode. In this regime,
absorption of a photon causes an avalanche of charge carriers, which can be detected
as a macroscopic current. To make the detection of a new photon possible, the
voltage must be reduced below breakdown in order to stop the avalanche eﬀect. This
can be achieved with a passive- or active-quenching circuit, where the avalanche
itself causes the quenching process, or by using the APD in gated mode, where the
voltage is applied only in certain time windows. [18] Gated mode is typically used
with QKD, when timing information of the incident light pulses is available to Bob.
In order to maximize the possible key rate when using APDs in gated mode, it is
desirable to have as many gates per unit time as possible. However, because the
charge carriers decay exponentially with time when the voltage is reduced below
breakdown, reducing the dead time between gates causes so-called afterpulses, false
detections due to avalanches in previous gates. [13] This fundamentally limits the
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maximum raw key rate that can be achieved with QKD when using APDs.
When detecting photons at wavelengths below 1100 nm, Si APDs can be used.
Such detectors are commercially available and feature quantum eﬃciencies up to
70% at 700 nm with maximum count rates of 50MHz and dark count rates of 50Hz
while operating at −20 ◦C. However, because of the large band gap of Si, it can not
be used to detect lower energy photons at 1310 nm and 1550 nm typically used with
optical ﬁbers. For the ﬁrst of the aforementioned wavelengths, germanium APDs can
be used, although InGaAs/InP APDs have replaced germanium, because these can
be used at both wavelengths. [13] However, the quantum eﬃciencies of these types
of APDs are much lower than that of the Si counterparts, around 10% in −50 ◦C
[12], and due to signiﬁcant afterpulsing, InGaAs/InP APDs can not be used with
passive quenching [13]. At telecom wavelengths, passive quenching and quantum
eﬃciency up to 56% can be achieved using parametric frequency up conversion and
Si APDs [19]. On the other hand, this solution has high dark count rates [19, 20].
4.3 Coding
When the BB84 protocol was introduced in Section 3.1.1, the states of the photons
used for transmitting the bit sequence from Alice to Bob were denoted by |±x〉 and
|±z〉 with the only limitation being that there must exist a measurement that can
unambiguously discriminate between the basis states of each basis, and the states
must follow Equations (15) and (16). The most intuitive example of such states
is the polarization of a single photon; the polarization can be measured in one of
two complementary bases, rectilinear {|l〉 , |↔〉} or diagonal {| ↔〉, |↔ 〉} [13]. Alice
can have four sources of linearly polarized light, each rotated by 45◦ relative to
the previous one, Bob can separate the two orthogonal polarization states using a
polarization beam splitter, and the basis choice is simply done by rotating the beam
splitter. However, polarization encoding is diﬃcult to implement in optical ﬁbers
due to birefringence; telecommunication ﬁbers do not conserve the polarization of
photons.
When using optical ﬁbers, a more practical option than polarization coding is to
code the bit value into the phase diﬀerence of two consecutive pulses of light. The
simplest possible QKD phase coding system is visualized in Figure 9. Here, Alice
splits the light pulse into two branches and applies a phase shift φA to one of them
from one of the two bases, {0, π} or {π/2, 3π/2}. The basis states are, therefore,
|−x〉 =
∣∣∣∣
√
µ/2
〉 ∣∣∣∣
√
µ/2
〉
, (30)
|+x〉 =
∣∣∣∣
√
µ/2eipi
〉 ∣∣∣∣
√
µ/2
〉
, (31)
|−z〉 =
∣∣∣∣
√
µ/2eipi/2
〉 ∣∣∣∣
√
µ/2
〉
, (32)
|+z〉 =
∣∣∣∣
√
µ/2ei3pi/2
〉 ∣∣∣∣
√
µ/2
〉
. (33)
According to the previously introduced notation, the states with a negative sign
represent the bit value 0 and states with a positive sign represent the bit value 1.
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After receiving the pulses, Bob applies a phase shift φB of either 0 or π/2 to the
other branch. This serves as his basis choice. Finally, Bob combines the branches
using either a beam splitter or a coupler. If Alice and Bob applied the same phase
shift, φA − φB = 0, a constructive interference takes place in one of the branches
of the coupler and a destructive interference in the other branch, and a photon is
detected at detector D1 corresponding to the bit value 0. On the other hand, if
they applied the opposite phase shifts from the same basis, φA − φB = π, a photon
is detected at D2 corresponding to the bit value 1. Thus, the detector at which a
photon was detected corresponds to the bit value encoded by Alice. On the other
hand, if they applied their phase shifts from diﬀerent bases, i.e. their basis choices
were incompatible, the photon is detected randomly in one of the detectors, and
these results are discarded in the sifting phase, when Alice and Bob compare their
basis choices, as discussed in Section 3.1.1. [13]
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Figure 9: Simple phase coding QKD system.
The implementation of phase coding described above functions well when the
distance between Alice and Bob is short. However, there must exist two optical
paths, and the length diﬀerence between these paths has to be extremely stable in
order to maintain the interference at Bob’s end. Since the distance is usually tens
of kilometers, this can be considered practically impossible. This problem can be
circumvented by using one path between Alice and Bob and unbalanced Mach-Zehnder
interferometers at both ends, as depicted in Figure 10. In this implementation, the
pulse can arrive to Bob at three diﬀerent times depending on the path it takes; the
ﬁrst times slot corresponds to the photon taking the short path at both ends, the last
slot corresponds to the long paths, and the middle slot corresponds to the short and
the long path or vice versa. Alice and Bob apply phase shifts according to the rules
described above, and these phase shifts determine whether the interference in the
center time slot is destructive or constructive. Although this implementation removes
the need for stability between two paths, the problem still exists in Alice’s and Bob’s
interferometers, and the length diﬀerence between the two arms must be adjusted
during long key exchange sessions to compensate for any drift. Furthermore, the two
possible paths corresponding to the middle time slot, short-long and long-short, must
be indistinguishable for interference to take place. Therefore, polarization eﬀects in
the two paths of the interferometers must be identical. [13]
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Figure 10: Phase coding using two Mach-Zehnder interferometers.
4.4 Plug & Play Implementation
The drawbacks related to using Mach-Zehnder interferometer implementation for
phase coding can be circumvented by using the so-called Plug & Play implementation,
which is depicted in Figure 11. Unlike with the previous implementations, now Bob
starts the protocol by emitting a macroscopic coherent pulse from his laser. This
pulse is split in the coupler C1 into two pulses, one going to the long and one to the
short arm. In these arms, the polarization of the pulses evolves in such a way that
the pulse in the short arm goes through the polarization beam splitter (PBS) into
the ﬁber connecting Alice and Bob, while the pulse in the long arm is reﬂected and
goes also into the same ﬁber. Therefore, both pulses are in the ﬁber propagating
towards Alice with some time diﬀerence caused by the length diﬀerence between the
two arms. Additionally, the polarizations of the two pulses are orthogonal. [21]
Both pulses are split again into two parts in the coupler C2. The fractions of the
pulses that propagate to the detector DA are used for the synchronisation of Alice
with Bob and to detect a possible Trojan horse attack, which is described in Section
4.10.2. After propagating through the delay line (DL), the remaining fraction of the
pulses is reﬂected back from a Faraday mirror (FM), which changes the polarization
states of both pulses to orthogonal ones. After the reﬂection, Alice’s phase modulator
(PMA) applies a phase shift to the second pulse encoding the bit value using the
aforementioned rules. Before the pulses propagate out of Alice’s device, they are
attenuated to mean photon number that is much less than one. [21]
Due to the possible birefringence of the optical ﬁber connecting Alice and Bob, the
polarizations of both pulses change as they propagate from Bob to Alice. However,
because the Faraday mirror changes the polarization states to orthogonal states,
exactly the opposite transformation is applied to the polarizations on the way back.
Therefore, the polarization of each returning pulse is orthogonal to the polarization
of the corresponding original pulse that Bob emitted to the ﬁber. Hence, the system
compensates for any birefringence eﬀects in the ﬁber automatically, as long as there
are no signiﬁcant changes in the birefringence of the ﬁber during the time that the
pulses travel from Bob to Alice and back.
After propagating back to Bob, the pulses take opposite paths from before at the
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polarization beam splitter due to the orthogonal polarization states. This is how the
Plug & Play system circumvents the need for compensation between the two arms.
If a pulse goes through the long (short) path when propagating from Bob to Alice, it
must take the short (long) path on the way back. [21] However, the path diﬀerence
must remain constant during the time the pulse propagates from Bob to Alice and
back.
After Bob has applied a phase shift, i.e. his basis choice, to the pulse in the
long arm, the pulses arrive to the coupler C1 at the same time. Finally, the pulses
interfere and a photon is detected either in detector DB1 or DB2 depending on Alice’s
and Bob’s phase shifts. [21]
Because in the Plug & Play system Bob sends macroscopic pulses to Alice, unlike
in other implementations, where Alice has the photon source, backscattering from
these pulses can cause signiﬁcant amounts of errors. To prevent this, Bob sends a
"train" of pulses to Alice, and a delay line (DL) is added to her device. The length of
this delay line is such that the whole pulse train can be stored in it. By knowing the
distance between him and Alice, Bob can emit the pulse train, ignore any detection
that occur during the time the pulses propagate to Alice, and detect the pulses once
they propagate back. [21]
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Figure 11: Phase coding using the Plug & Play scheme.
4.5 Error Sources
As was discussed in Section 4.2, the dark counts and afterpulses of the single photon
detectors cause false photon detections and, therefore, increase the QBER of a
QKD system even without eavesdropping. When using two detectors and the BB84
protocol, the QBER caused by the dark counts, Qdet, is
Qdet =
pdark
tηdµ
. (34)
Where pdark is the probability of a dark count per gate, t is the transmittance of the
quantum channel, ηd is the probability of detection of the detectors, and µ is the
mean photon number of a pulse. [13] For example, with typical values pdark = 10
−5
and t = ηd = µ = 0.1, the QBER due to the dark counts is 1%.
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In addition to Qdet, the second most important term in the total QBER of ﬁber
based QKD implementations is the error rate caused by the optical system,
Qopt =
1− V
2
. (35)
Here, V is the visibility of the optical system, which measures the distinguishability
of two orthogonal states. [13] For phase coding, this is simply the fringe visibility,
V =
I1 − I2
I1 + I2
, (36)
where I1 and I2 are the intensities at detectors 1 and 2, respectively, when all intensity
should be at detector 1 due to interference. Unlike Qdet, Qopt is clearly independent
of the losses in the quantum channel.
4.6 Random Number Generation
Before Alice and Bob can share a secret encryption key using QKD, they must be
able to generate random bit values for their basis choices and for Alice’s raw key.
These bit values should be as random as possible, i.e. all bit sequences should have
the same probability of being generated, because this minimizes Eve’s information.
The so-called pseudorandom number generators can be implemented using classical
computers. However, the processes used in these types of generators are fundamentally
deterministic, and knowing the state of the generator at some point may give Eve
information about previously generated keys. Therefore, some physical process should
be used for random number generation.
Like in QKD, the fundamental randomness of quantum mechanics can also be
used to generate truly random bits for the key distribution process. The simplest way
of implementing such a quantum random number generator is a single photon source,
a 50:50 beam splitter, and two single photon detectors [22, 23]. When a single photon
interacts with such a beam splitter, which path the photon takes after the beam
splitter is purely random each path having equal probability, and the path that the
photon took can be determined using the single photon detectors. When one detector
is assigned the bit value 1 and the other one bit value 0, a random bit sequence of
any length can be generated using consecutive measurements. However, since an
exactly 50:50 beam splitter is impossible to implement, mathematical operations
must be used to remove any bias caused by this imbalance [22].
4.7 Maximum Distance
As with any signal in an optical ﬁber, the quantum signals used in QKD decay
exponentially with distance. In modern telecommunication ﬁbers, a typical value
for this attenuation is 0.20 dB/km at 1550 nm wavelength. Therefore, eﬃcient ways
of amplifying optical signals without converting them into electrical ones have been
developed. However, these ampliﬁers do not conserve the quantum state of the
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signal photons, since this would contradict the no-cloning theorem. Therefore, these
methods are not applicable to QKD.
When Alice sends a coherent pulse with a mean photon number µ < 1, over a
ﬁber of length l with attenuation of β, and the detection eﬃciency of Bob’s detector
is ηd, the probability of detection is
pdet = ηdµ× 10−βl/10. (37)
Naturally, Alice’s and Bob’s optical systems introduce additional losses that are
neglected here. Thus, as the probability of detection decreases exponentially as a
function of distance, after some point it becomes of the same order of magnitude
with the probability of a dark count in Bob’s detector. In this regime, the QBER
increases rapidly, as can be seen from Equation (34), which causes the secret key
rate to drop to zero. Thus, the dark counts of Bob’s detectors fundamentally limit
the maximum distance at which QKD can function.
Theoretically, the so-called quantum repeaters can extend the range of QKD by
using entanglement swapping. However, these types of repeaters require quantum
memories [24] and the ability to do entanglement swapping between these memories
[25]. Thus, these kinds of repeaters have not been realized in practice.
A more practical solution for increasing the range of QKD with current technology
is to use the so-called trusted nodes, where each node shares a secret key with the
next and previous node using QKD. When a message is sent through the nodes, it
is decrypted and then encrypted again with a new key in each node. Alternatively,
the secret keys between nodes can be used with OTP to securely transfer a new
secret key from Alice to Bob so that the message does not need to be decrypted
and encrypted in each node [26]. Thus, nodes need to be physically secure so that
messages or keys can not be compromised in the them. An example of a QKD system
with a single trusted node between Alice and Bob is depicted in Figure 12 (a).
The idea of trusted nodes can be extended to construct QKD networks, where each
node can be connected to multiple other nodes in the network, and each connected
node pair shares a secret key using QKD. An example of such network is presented
in Figure 12 (b). Clearly, this kind of system increases the robustness of QKD,
because as long as there are enough connection in the network, there are multiple
paths a message can take between two nodes, which makes any type of denial of
service attack more diﬃcult. Furthermore, diﬀerent links do not have to use the same
protocol and some can even be free space QKD links, while others are implemented
using optical ﬁbers [26, 27].
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Figure 12: (a) A QKD system with a trusted node, (b) a QKD network.
4.8 Free Space
In addition to using an optical ﬁber as the quantum channel of QKD, research eﬀort
has also been directed to the implementation of QKD in free space. As was discussed
above, the maximum distance of QKD is fundamentally limited by the absorption of
silica when using optical ﬁbers. On the other hand, for wavelengths 780 – 850 nm,
absorption caused by the atmosphere can be less than 0.1 dB/km [12]. Furthermore,
silicon APDs can be used as the single photon detectors at these wavelengths, which
results in signiﬁcantly higher detection eﬃciencies, as was discussed in Section 4.2.
Lastly, decoherence caused by the atmosphere is practically negligible, and therefore,
polarization coding can be used for free-space QKD [12], which simpliﬁes the design
of Bob’s device, since interference does not need to be used.
Although in the ideal situation, the implementation of free-space QKD is possible
with lower losses than with ﬁber based systems, also new sources for losses are
introduced. Most signiﬁcantly, beam spreading and alignment introduce geometric
losses, which can be reduced with optics and additional systems that align the
beam correctly. Additionally, stray light from other light sources increases the error
rate of free-space QKD compared to optical ﬁber implementations, and losses are
signiﬁcantly aﬀected by weather conditions. Despite these challenges, free space
QKD has been demonstrated over a 144 km link with an average secret key rate of
12.8 bits/s [28].
Maybe the most interesting application for free space QKD is satellite communi-
cation. For satellite to satellite communication, there are basically no absorption
losses due to the close-to-vacuum environment. Furthermore, even for communi-
cation between a ground station and a satellite in low earth orbit, the losses are
approximately 30 – 50 dB, and free space QKD links have been demonstrated with
even higher losses [29]. With ground to satellite communication, the satellite could
act as a trusted node between Alice and Bob due to its physical isolation, possibly
enabling QKD for much larger distances than what is possible using optical ﬁbers.
4.9 Wavelength-Division Multiplexing
Wavelength-division multiplexing (WDM) is an important technology in modern
optical communication systems. By using multiple channels at diﬀerent wavelengths
in a single optical ﬁber, data rates can be increased by orders of magnitude compared
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to using a single wavelength in each ﬁber. Fortunately, this technology can also be
applied to QKD in multiple ways.
In many QKD systems, a macroscopic timing signal for synchronization between
Alice and Bob has been used in the same ﬁber with the quantum channel using WDM
[30]. Other experiments have demonstrated that even the classical channel can be
implemented in the same ﬁber with the quantum channel [31], which simpliﬁes the
deployment of QKD in practical scenarios, since only a single optical ﬁber is needed
between Alice and Bob. Even implementations of multiple classical channels and with
a quantum channel in a single ﬁber using dense wavelength-division multiplexing
(DWDM) have been demonstrated [32, 33, 34]. Lastly, WDM can also be used
to implement multiple quantum channel in a single ﬁber [35], which signiﬁcantly
increases the secret key rate.
4.10 Side Channel Attacks
As was discussed in Section 3.1.2, Eve can obtain information about the raw key
by eavesdropping on the quantum channel in various ways. Fortunately, due to the
properties of quantum mechanics, this always causes errors to the raw key. Thus,
Eve’s information about the key can be minimized by proper analysis to ﬁnd the
correct bounds for the allowed QBER and with the use of privacy ampliﬁcation.
However, when a QKD system is implemented using practical components described
in the previous sections, side channels for obtaining secret information are opened to
Eve. Furthermore, many of these attacks can be implemented in ways that are not
detectable to Alice and Bob without new ways of monitoring the quantum channel.
4.10.1 Photon Number Splitting Attack
The most practical compromise for the single photon source needed for QKD is a
highly attenuated laser, as was discussed in Section 4.1. Since a laser is a coherent
light source, the amount of photons in a single pulse follows a Poissonian distribution
according to Equation (29). Therefore, even when the mean number of photons in
a pulse, µ, is less than one, there are cases where Alice’s pulse contains multiple
photons. Because the same information is encoded into every photon in a pulse, Eve
can use this to her advantage by measuring the photon count in each pulse using a
quantum nondemolition measurement. If the pulse contains only one photon, Eve
blocks it, because she cannot obtain any information about the bit value without
perturbing the state. However, if the pulse contains more than one photon, Eve can
store one of the photons into a quantum memory while letting rest of the photons in
the pulse go through to Bob unaltered. When Alice publicly discloses the correct
basis in the sifting phase, Eve can measure the state in her quantum memory in the
correct basis and get all information about the correct bit value. This way Eve can
obtain the whole raw key without introducing any errors that Alice and Bob could
detect. This scheme is called the photon number splitting (PNS) attack. [36, 37]
Because the PNS attack requires Eve to block all of the pulses that contain only
one photon, the attack introduces extremely high losses. For this not to be detectable,
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the ﬁber that Alice and Bob use as the quantum channel must have high losses
without the PNS attack, and Eve needs a channel with lower losses to transfer the
remaining photons to Bob. In the worst case scenario, Eve can be located physically
close to Alice so that the losses before her measurement are negligible, and she
can transmit the remaining photons to Bob without losses. If the attenuation per
kilometer of the ﬁber used by Alice and Bob is β, length of the ﬁber is l, and the
mean photon number per pulse is µ, Bob detects on average µ× 10−βl/10 photons per
each pulse sent by Alice. This must be equal or greater than the probability that a
pulse contains more than one photon, pn>1(µ), for the PNS attack to be undetectable,
if Eve uses a lossless channel to transmit the remaining photons to Bob:
µ× 10−βl/10 ≥ pn>1(µ). (38)
Thus, the maximum distance beyond which the PNS attack becomes undetectable is
lmax = −
10 log10
(
pn>1(µ)
µ
)
β
. (39)
This means that for typical values of β = 0.2 dB/km and µ = 0.1, BB84 becomes
unsecure with ﬁbers longer than l = 66 km.
In its most basic form, Bob can detect the PNS attack by measuring the photon
statistics of the detected photons. Because Eve blocks all pulses that contain less
than two photons, she alters the Poissonian distribution. However, this requires that
Bob has a detector that can measure the number of photons in a pulse, which is often
not the case with single photon detectors. Furthermore, Eve can alter the photon
statistics of the states she forwards to Bob by blocking additional photons, making
the distribution Poissonian [38].
To counter the PNS attack, Alice must decrease the mean photon number of her
pulses linearly with the transmittance t = 10−βl/10 of the quantum channel. When
this is combined with the fact that the secret key rate with a pure single photon
source is proportional to the transmittance, the secret key rate of BB84 with a
Poissonian photon source becomes proportional to t2. [39, 40]
In addition to a way of transmitting the remaining photons with low losses to
Bob, Eve must also be able to measure the number of photons in a pulse without
disturbing the state of the pulse, which is not possible with current technology [13].
It could also be argued that if such a measurement becomes feasible, Alice could use
it to produce pure single photon states by removing any additional photons from her
pulses. Furthermore, the PNS attack requires Eve to have a quantum memory in
which to store the state of the photon until the correct measurement basis is revealed
during the sifting phase. However, a quantum memory with a long enough lifetime
has not been realized in practice [41, 42]. Even if such a memory were possible to
manufacture in the future, Alice and Bob could add a delay longer than the coherence
time of the memory between the raw key exchange and the sifting phases making
the memory ineﬀective.
In cases where the number of photons in a pulse is larger or equal to three,
Eve can use an even more powerful attack than the PNS attack by conducting a
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measurement, where she obtains a conclusive results about the state of the photons
with probability
pc = 1−
(
1
2
)⌊n−12 ⌋
. (40)
If the measurement is conclusive, she can prepare a new photon in the correct state
and send it to Bob, if not, she can discard the photons. In this attack, no quantum
memory is needed, and because Eve can send the information classically to a friend
located physically close to Bob, she does not need a low loss channel. [37]
4.10.2 Trojan Horse Attack
Eve does not necessarily need to obtain information about the secret key from the
photons used for the key distribution, but she can also use a photon source of her own
in the so-called Trojan horse attack. By injecting her photons into Alice’s or Bob’s
device and analyzing the backscattered light, Eve can obtain information about the
structure of their devices and even deduce the correct bit values if Alice codes the
secret bit values into Eve’s photons. [43] How realistic this type of attack is, depends
highly on the physical realization of the protocol.
The simplest way to counter the Trojan horse attack is for Alice to use an isolator
at her output, so that any light sent by Eve is blocked. However, Eve is not limited
by technology and could send more intense light, which would get through due to
the ﬁnite attenuation of the isolator. Furthermore, for realizations like Plug & Play,
described in Section 4.4, where Bob sends pulses of light to Alice, this solution
is not applicable. Therefore, additional counter measures must be used to detect
unusually high light intensities, and components that encode the bit information, i.e.
phase modulators, should be active only when used. Additionally, ﬁlters should be
used to prevent Eve from using light at diﬀerent wavelength for the probing. Eve’s
information can also be reduced by randomizing the global phase of the states when
using phase coding. Since the secret bit value is encoded to the phase diﬀerence of
two pulses, this does not aﬀect the performance of the system. [43]
4.10.3 Blinding Attack
Since most single photon detectors in QKD are based on avalanche photo diodes
operating in Geiger mode, as discussed in Section 4.2, Eve can also use these
components to obtain additional information about the raw key. By sending bright
continuous-wave light to Bob’s detectors, Eve can force the APDs to linear mode,
where they function as classical light detectors with some optical power threshold.
By superimposing pulses of light over the continuous light, Eve can gain full control
over Bob’s detectors. [44]
To use the control of Bob’s detectors to her advantage, Eve can conduct an
intercept-resend attack, where she measures the phase of Alice’s photons in random
bases and resends her results to Bob in the superimposed classical pulses, the power
of each pulse being just above Bob’s detectors threshold. If Eve’s and Bob’s basis
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choices match, Bob detects the same bit value as Eve. On the other hand, if their
basis choices are diﬀerent, the pulse, and therefore the power, is split between Bob’s
detectors, and they do not click, because the power is below the threshold in both
detectors. After the raw key exchange, Eve can eavesdrop on the sifting in the public
channel and obtain the whole secret key without causing any errors. [44] However,
Eve causes additional losses, because the basis choice of Alice, Bob, and Eve must
match for a bit value to be accepted to the secret key.
Like the Trojan horse attack, this basic form of the blinding attack can be
prevented by using an additional optical power meter at Bob’s input to detect Eve’s
continuous light source. However, the detecting of the control pulses may be much
more diﬃcult due to possibly low threshold power in the transition between Geiger
and linear mode [44].
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5 Protocols
After the invention of BB84, there have been numerous other QKD protocols, some
of these modifying BB84 to increase the robustness against the PNS attack, some
introducing altogether new ways of encoding the bits value, while most have no
practical signiﬁcance. This section introduces the most important QKD protocols
beyond BB84.
5.1 BB84 Related
This section introduces three protocols, SARG04, decoy state, and T12, which can
be considered as modiﬁcations of BB84 to make it signiﬁcantly more robust against
the photon number splitting attack.
5.1.1 SARG04
The transmission and measurement scheme of photons in SARG04 is identical to that
of BB84. Instead, the diﬀerences are in how Alice and Bob encode the information
into the measurement results and what information they disclose during sifting. In
SARG04, the basis contains the bit value that Alice wishes to send to Bob; the
X basis corresponds to bit value 0, and the Z basis corresponds to bit value 1.
The relation between the bases is presented in Equations (15) and (16). In the
sifting phase, instead of disclosing the basis, since this would disclose the secret
bit, Alice discloses one of four possible sifting pairs Aω,ω′ = {|ωx〉 , |ω′z〉}, where
ω, ω′ ∈ {+,−}, so that one of the two states in the pair is the state she sent. If the
state that corresponds to Bob’s measurement result is not in the sifting pair, he can
deduce which state and bit value Alice sent. [36]
For example, if Alice sends the state |−x〉, then discloses the pair A−,− =
{|−x〉 , |−z〉}, and Bob measures in the X basis and obtains the result−x or measures
in the Z basis and obtains the result −z, Bob can not know the state Alice sent.
|−x〉
|−x〉
|+z〉
|−z〉
X
1/2
Z
1/2 1/4
1/4
Alice Bob
Figure 13: An example of SARG04. Alice sends state |−x〉 and discloses the pair
A−,−. In the case marked with green, Bob knows which state Alice sent.
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However, if Bob measures in the Z basis and obtains the result +z, since this state
is not in the sifting pair, he knows that Alice must have measured in diﬀerent basis
from him and the original state must have been |−x〉. Therefore, the bit value is
0. This process is visualised in Figure 13. While with BB84, Alice and Bob must
discard on average 1/2 of the photons during sifting due to basis incompatibility,
with SARG04, 3/4 of the photons have to be discarded due to Bob’s measurement
being inconclusive [36].
Interestingly, unlike with BB84, with SARG04, Eve’s eavesdropping actually
decreases the fraction of the photons that have to be discarded, as can be seen by
comparing Figure 14, where the eavesdropping is visualized, with Figure 13; without
eavesdropping 3/4 of photons are discarded, while with eavesdropping the fraction
is 5/8. Figure 14 also shows that eavesdropping in SARG04 causes 1/8
3/8
= 1/3 of
accepted bits to be incorrect compared to BB84’s 1/4.
|−x〉
|−x〉
|+z〉
|−z〉
|−x〉
|+z〉
|−z〉
|+x〉
|−x〉
|+z〉
|+x〉
|−x〉
|−z〉
X
1/2
Z
1/2 1/4
1/4
X
1/4
Z
1/4 1/8
1/8
1/8
X
1/16
1/16
1/8
Z
1/8
X
1/16
1/16
1/8
Z
Alice Eve Bob
Figure 14: An example of eavesdropping in SARG04. Alice sends state |−x〉 and
discloses the pair A−,−. In the cases marked with green, Bob thinks he knows which
state Alice sent.
The main advantage of SARG04, its robustness against the photon number
splitting attack, is based on the fact that Alice does not disclose her measurement
basis. Therefore, even though Eve can wait for the sifting phase before she measures
the state of her photon that she has stored in a quantum memory, she does not
know which basis she should use for the measurement. Thus, her measurement is
conclusive only in 1/4 of the cases, while with BB84 she obtains a conclusive results
every time. [36]
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In practical terms, the robustness of SARG04 against the PNS attack leads to
Alice being able to use higher mean photon numbers in her pulses. As a function
of the transmittance of the quantum channel t, the optimal mean photon number
scales as µ ∝ t1/2 [37, 40]. Therefore, the secret key rate is proportional to t3/2, while
with BB84 optimal µ ∝ t, which caused the secret key rate to be proportional to t2.
This clearly increases the secret key rates and maximum operating distance of QKD.
Considering that this is achieved without any hardware changes, the result is quite
signiﬁcant.
Interestingly, when considering single photon implementations, the maximum
QBER value for which SARG04 is secure against coherent attacks is Q . 11%, [37].
This is the same bound that was mentioned for BB84 in Section 3.2.
5.1.2 Decoy State
Like SARG04, decoy states are a modiﬁcation of BB84, that are used to make the
protocol more robust against the PNS attack. This modiﬁcation, however, actually
changes the photons exchange part of the protocol, unlike SARG04. [45]
The key distribution procedure with decoy states is identical to that of BB84
without decoy states, but now Alice replaces some fraction of the signal states with
decoy states. These decoy states are otherwise identical to the signal states, expect
that they have a larger mean photon number. The signal states are still used for
key distribution, while the decoy states are used only for the detection of a PNS
attack. Because Eve blocks all single photon pulses in the PNS attack, and she
cannot distinguish signal states from the decoy states, the attack causes abnormal
diﬀerences in the yields of decoy and signal states, which can be detected by Alice
and Bob. [45]
More precisely, µ and µ′ are the mean photon numbers of Alice’s signal and
decoy state, respectively, and ηn and η
′
n are the probabilities that Bob’s imperfect
detector detects the respective pulse type with n photons after the losses caused by
the quantum channel. Then, the yields of the signal and decoy sources are
Ys =
∑
n
pn(µ)ηn, (41)
Yd =
∑
n
pn(µ
′)η′n. (42)
Here, pn(µ) is the probability that a pulse with a mean photon number µ contains
n photons, determined by the Poissonian distribution in Equation (29). Because
the signal and decoy states have identical properties apart from the mean photon
number, η′n = ηn. After Bob has received all of the photons from Alice, she declares
which states were decoy states and they can compute the yields Ys and Yd. If Yd is
much larger than Ys, they abort the protocol, because this can be caused by Eve’s
PNS attack. [45]
Although the original idea of decoy states was to use a single type of strong decoy
states with weaker signal states, better results can actually be achieved by using
decoy states with varying mean photon numbers. The varying of µ′ allows Alice and
Bob to estimate the values of ηn and detect any abnormal variations. Furthermore,
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this analysis can be applied to the QBER as well. If the QBER of a n photon pulse
is qn, the total QBER Qµ of a coherent signal with mean photon number µ is
Qµ =
∑
n pn(µ)ηnqn∑
n pn(µ)ηn
. (43)
Again, because signal and decoy states can not be distinguished, qn are independent
of the pulse type. [46]
The most notable improvement achieved by the decoy state QKD compared to
BB84 is that the mean photon number of the signal states does not need to be
adjusted according to the losses in the quantum channel. Therefore, the secret key
rate of the system is proportional to the transmittance t of the quantum channel [46].
Thus, with the use of decoy states, the same scaling over distance can be achieved as
with an ideal implementation of BB84 using a pure single photon source, while with
BB84 using coherent pulses without decoy states the possibility of an PNS attack
limits the scaling of the secret key rate to t2 and with SARG04 to t3/2.
5.1.3 BB84 With Basis Bias and T12
As was discussed in Section 3.1.1, the security of BB84 is based on the usage of two
complementary measurement bases, and Alice chooses either basis with probability
of 1/2. However, Alice and Bob can also add bias to their basis choices by choosing
one of the bases with the probability p and the other one with probability 1− p [47].
Since the probability of Alice’s and Bob’s bases being incompatible is 2p(1− p), this
clearly improves the eﬃciency of the protocol, because smaller fraction of the raw key
is discarded in sifting. However, this also enables Eve to obtain more information
while causing a smaller amount of errors, if she always uses the basis of higher
probability for her measurement. To prevent this, Alice and Bob have to compute
separate QBER values for each basis, which can be used to eﬀectively detect this new
eavesdropping strategy [47]. In fact, the security of this scheme can be guaranteed
for any arbitrary small non-zero value of p [47].
The decoy state and basis bias ideas have been combined in the so-called T12
QKD protocol. In T12, p = 1/16, which causes only 11.7% of the raw key to be
discarded in sifting. Using a laser source pulsed at 1GHz, this protocol has been
experimentally demonstrated to provide a secret key rate of 1.09Mbits/s, while with
an equivalent unbiased decoy state BB84 secret key rate of 0.63Mbits/s was achieved
in the same experiment. [48]
5.2 Distributed-Phase-Reference
Distributed-phase-reference quantum key distribution protocols represent a more
practical approach to QKD. Unlike many theoretical QKD protocols, like BB84,
that require an ideal single photon source to provide unconditional security, these
protocols have been designed to use coherent pulses for the transmission of secret
bits. Additionally, the protocols themselves include how the key distribution is
accomplished in practice using physical components.
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5.2.1 Differential Phase Shift
Alice’s and Bob’s devices for the Diﬀerential Phase Shift (DPS) protocol are depicted
in Figure 15. Alice starts the protocol by generating a sequence of coherent pulses
with a time interval T between each consecutive pulse, shifts the phase of each pulse
randomly by either 0 or π, and attenuates the sequence so that the mean photon
number µ < 1 for each pulse. Thus, the state of every pulse in the sequence is
either
∣∣∣√µ〉 or
∣∣∣√µejpi〉. As Bob receives the pulses, he splits the sequence into two
branches using a coupler. He then recombines the two branches using another coupler
so that the length diﬀerence between the two branches is set to be equal to the time
interval T . Due to this time diﬀerence, the pulse sequence from the longer path is
delayed by one pulse compared to the sequence in the shorter path, as depicted in
Figure 16. When the paths are combined, if the phase diﬀerence between consecutive
pulses is 0, the pulses interfere constructively in the output of the coupler connected
to detector D1 and destructively in the other output and vice versa, if the phase shift
is π. Detection in detectors D1 and D2 represents bit values 0 and 1, respectively.
However, because the mean photon number of each pulse is less than one, Bob does
not detect a photon in all time slots. Therefore, to generate a secret key, Bob needs
to tell Alice at which time slot he detected a photon. Since Alice knows the phase
of each pulse, she can deduce in which detector the photon was detected, i.e. the
correct bit value. [49]
PM ATT
Alice Bob
Laser {0, pi}
T
D1
D2
Figure 15: Implementation of the Diﬀerential Phase Shift protocol.
Eve can try to conduct an intercept-resend attack using the same measurement
scheme as Bob. If she measures the phase between two consecutive pulses, labelled i
and i+ 1, she has two possible strategies for the resend part. First, she can resend
two new pulses with a mean photon number of 0.5 per pulse and the correct phase
diﬀerence. Because she did not measure the phase diﬀerence between pulses i− 1
and i or i+1 and i+2, she sends empty pulses to the slots i− 1 and i+2. However,
if Bob now measures the phase diﬀerence between pulses i − 1 and i or i + 1 and
i+ 2, the result is going to be random and can introduce errors when Alice and Bob
compute the QBER. On the other hand, Eve can also use the same mean photon
number as Alice for all of the pulses and use a random phase for the pulses i − 1
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Figure 16: Interference of pulses in the Diﬀerential Phase Shift protocol.
and i+ 2. However, like the previous strategy, this also introduces errors when Bob
measures the phase diﬀerence between diﬀerent pulses from Eve. [49]
The fact that in the DPS protocol the bit values are encoded into the diﬀerential
phase of two consecutive pulses also makes it robust against the photon number
splitting attack. In order to obtain any information, Eve must ﬁnd a photon that
is in a superposition state of being in two consecutive pulses. Furthermore, to
conduct a PNS attack, there must be two such photons so that Eve can store one of
them. Additionally, Eve must block all other pulses, because she can not obtain any
information from them. Like with the intercept-resend strategies described above,
this blocking can be detected by Bob, because he can measure the phase diﬀerence
between a blocked pulse and a pulse that Eve has let go through. In these cases, a
photon is detected randomly in one of the detectors causing errors to the ﬁnal key.
[50]
5.2.2 Coherent One Way
Like with the Diﬀerential Phase Shift protocol, in the Coherent One Way (COW)
protocol, Alice produces a sequence of coherent pulses of a mean photon number µ
equally spaced in time. However, she does not modulate the phase of the pulses,
but lets the phase diﬀerence remain constant. Naturally, the coherence time of the
laser used must be longer than the time diﬀerence between the pulses. Alice uses an
intensity modulator to block oﬀ some of the pulses generating three possible pulse
pairs:
|0i〉 = |√µ〉2i−1 |0〉2i , (44)
|1i〉 = |0〉2i−1 |
√
µ〉2i , (45)
|di〉 = |√µ〉2i−1 |
√
µ〉2i . (46)
A pulse followed by an empty pulse corresponds to a bit value 0, an empty pulse
followed by an pulse corresponds to a bit value 1 and two consecutive pulses is used
as a decoy state. [51] These possibilities are visualized in Figure 17.
To obtain the correct bit value, Bob needs to measure the time of arrival of the
non-empty pulse. For this, he needs only one single photon detector DB, as depicted
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2i 2i− 1 2i 2i− 1 2i 2i− 1
Bit value 0 Bit value 1 Decoy
Figure 17: Pulse pairs in the Coherent One Way protocol.
in Figure 18. However, this scheme alone cannot provide any security. Therefore,
Bob splits the pulse sequence into two branches using the coupler cB. Fraction tB
of the pulses go to the detector DB, while the rest go to an interferometer, which is
used to check the coherence of two consecutive pulses in the same fashion as with the
diﬀerential phase shift protocol. Because Alice does not modulate the phase of the
pulses, the same detector clicks for every pair of non-empty pulses. In addition to
using the decoy states to check the coherence of the sequence, coherence checks can
be done also between diﬀerent bits. [51] For example, if Alice sends the bit sequence
10, coherence can be tested between the second pulse of the ﬁrst bit and the ﬁrst
pulse of the second bit, which are both non-empty.
Laser IM
DB
D1
D2
Alice Bob
T
cB
Figure 18: Implementation of the Coherent One Way protocol.
After Bob has receiver all of the pulses, he informs Alice in which time slots he
had a detection and when detector D2 clicked. Alice tells Bob which bit detections
were due to decoy states, and must be discarded. She also analyzes from the detector
D2 data whether the coherence was broken by an eavesdropper. [51]
Both of the aforementioned distributed-phase-reference protocols, DPS and COW,
diﬀer from the previously discussed QKD schemes in the sense that Bob does not
make any choice about his basis of measurement. Therefore, there is no need for
any sifting and no fraction of the raw key is lost in the sifting phase, which clearly
improves eﬃciency of the protocols.
Because the coherence between diﬀerent bit values is crucial for distributed-phase-
reference protocols, the states coding separate bit values can not be considered as
separate signals, as can be done with BB84 or SARG04. Instead, all of the coherent
states encoding the bit sequence have to be analyzed as a whole. Therefore, methods
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that can be used to prove the security of other protocols cannot be used for DPS or
COW. [12]
Currently, the longest distance on record for QKD, 307 km with an average secret
key rate of 3.18 bits/s was achieved using the COW protocol. Furthermore, in the
same experiment, the highest secret key rate for distances over 100 km was also
demonstrated with 12.7 kbits/s. [52]
5.3 Other Schemes
BB84 and all of the aforementioned protocols derived from it use two complementary
bases of measurement to ensure the security of QKD. Furthermore, all of the protocols
mentioned so far are so-called prepare and measure and also discrete variable protocols.
This section brieﬂy introduces other interesting approaches to QKD.
5.3.1 B92
Secure key distribution can also be achieved with only two non-orthogonal states as
is done with the B92 protocol. Alice begins the protocol by preparing each photon
either in state |−x〉 or in state |−z〉. Here, the same notation is used as with BB84
in Section 3.1.1 for consistency. However, the states |−x〉 and |−z〉 do not have to
follow the deﬁnitions used in BB84, but they must be non-orthogonal. After receiving
the photons, Bob conducts one of two measurements described by the projection
operators Pˆx = 1−|−z〉 〈−z| and Pˆz = 1−|−x〉 〈−x|. These operators project states
onto subspaces orthogonal to |−z〉 and |−x〉, respectively.
Pˆx |−z〉 = (1− |−z〉 〈−z|) |−z〉 = 0 (47)
Pˆx |−x〉 = (1− |−z〉 〈−z|) |−x〉 = |−x〉 − 〈−z|−x〉 |−z〉 (48)
Therefore, the measurements Pˆx and Pˆz yield zero when applied on |−z〉 and |−x〉,
respectively. On the other hand, if Pˆx is applied on |−x〉 or Pˆz on |−z〉, the
measurement yields a positive result with probability 1 − | 〈−x|−z〉 |2 and zero
otherwise. [53]
After the measurements, Alice and Bob discard any cases where the measurement
result was zero. Without eavesdropping or errors, Alice and Bob have now a shared
key, because in the remaining cases either Alice sent the state |−x〉 and Bob measured
Pˆx or Alice sent |−z〉 and Bob measured Pˆz. Like in other QKD schemes, Alice and
Bob use some fraction of the shared key to compute the QBER to ensure that there
has been no eavesdropping. [53]
5.3.2 Entanglement Based
In all of the QKD protocols discussed above, Alice initiates the key distribution by
preparing a photon in some state and sending the photon to Bob, and the security is
provided by the non-distinguishability of non-orthogonal states. This approach is
usually referred to as prepare and measure. However, another fundamental property of
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quantum mechanics, entanglement, can also be used to achieve secure key distribution
between Alice and Bob.
In the ﬁrst entanglement base QKD protocol, E91, a source produces a pair of
entangled spin-1
2
particles in a so-called singlet state
|singlet〉 = 1√
2
(|↑〉 |↓〉 − |↓〉 |↑〉) . (49)
As can be seen from this deﬁnition, due to the entanglement, when the spin of one
of the particles in a singlet state is measured, the spin of the other particle is also
known, regardless of the physical distance between the particles at the time of the
measurement. In order to use this state for key distribution, the ﬁrst particle is sent
to Alice and the second one to Bob. Alice measures the spin in one of three angles
{0, π/4, π/2} randomly, while Bob chooses one of the angles {π/4, π/2, 3π/4}. In
cases, where Alice and Bob measure the spin using the same angle, their results are
perfectly anti-correlated, and these results can be used to generate a secret key. In
cases where the spin was measured in diﬀerent angles, Alice and Bob can test Bell’s
theorem to detect any eavesdropping. [54]
Bell’s theorem is actually not necessary for the security of entanglement based
QKD, as was demonstrated by the entanglement based version of BB84, BBM92.
This protocol also uses a source of singlet states, like E91, but now Alice and Bob
simply measure the states of their particles in random bases, producing a secret key
in an identical manner as with BB84. [55]
An interesting aspect of entanglement based QKD protocols compared to prepare
and measure schemes is the fact that the bit value is not actually encoded to the
particles that travel between Alice and Bob. Instead, the entanglement simply ensures
the correlation between Alice’s and Bob’s measurement results in the cases where
their basis choices match.
5.3.3 Continuous Variable
All of the QKD protocols discussed so far are discrete variable protocols, where single
photons, or in most practical scenarios, attenuated laser pulses, are used to encode
single bit values and the detection is done using single photon detectors. Another
demonstrated scheme is continuous variable quantum key distribution, where the
properties of much stronger coherent light pulses are used with homodyne detection.
The quantum states of coherent light can be split into two quadratures
Xˆ1 =
1
2
(
aˆ† + aˆ
)
, (50)
Xˆ2 =
i
2
(
aˆ† − aˆ
)
. (51)
Here, aˆ† and aˆ are the creation and annihilation operators of the number states
|n〉, respectively. Since the operators Xˆ1 and Xˆ2 do not commute, the observables
X1 and X2 obey the uncertainty relation of Equation (6). For a coherent state, as
deﬁned in Equation (27), the uncertainty is split equally between the two quadratures,
36
∆X1 = ∆X2. However, the uncertainty of one quadrature can be decreased as long
as the uncertainty of the other one is increased so that Equation (6) applies. This
produces the so-called squeezed states of light.
The properties of squeezed light described above can be directly applied to QKD.
In the simplest case, BB84 can be implemented if Alice displaces the expectation
value and squeezes one of the two quadratures randomly and Bob measures one
of the quadratures randomly as well. If Bob measures the quadrature that Alice
has squeezed, his measurement result correlates with the expectation value set by
Alice. If he measures the wrong quadrature, the result is random due to the large
uncertainty of the other quadrature. [56]
The aforementioned QKD scheme can be seen a hybrid between discrete and
continuous variable QKD protocols, since Alice sends a discrete value and Bob
measures a continuous value. However, squeezed states can be also used to share
purely continuous variables between Alice and Bob by applying Gaussian modulation
to either one of the quadratures [57] or both [58]. To obtain a secret key from these
continuous variables, specialized error correction protocols have to be used and the
performance of the whole system is highly dependent on the performance of the error
correction [12].
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6 Setup
For all of the measurements presented here, ID Quantique’s ID3110 Clavis2 commercial
QKD platform was used. The platform implements phase coding using the Plug &
Play scheme, described in Section 4.4, with a 24 km delay line and BB84 and SARG04
protocols. The photon source of the platform is an attenuated laser operating at
1550 nm wavelength, and it emits coherent pulses at 5MHz repetition rate. Photon
detection is done using InGaAs avalanche photo diodes cooled to −35 ◦C in gated
operation. In both Alice’s and Bob’s end of the system, the platform is connected to a
PC using a USB connection, and the PCs manage all of the classical communication,
i.e. error correction, privacy ampliﬁcation, and authentication, using an ethernet
connection. The distributed secret keys are stored in the RAM of both PCs, and they
can be requested using the IDQ3P protocol. The initial secret, used for authentication
after the ﬁrst round of key distribution, is stored on the hard drive of both PCs and
can be changed by the user.
On the software side, the platform is managed by two programs, called QKDMenu
and QKDSequence. The former oﬀers greater amount of control over the key distri-
bution process and is intended for demonstrational and troubleshooting purposes,
while the latter automatically manages all of the required steps of QKD, and the
only required user input is the loss of the quantum channel as the software is started.
Even the used protocol is chosen automatically, based on these losses; BB84 is used
for 3 dB and below and SARG04 otherwise. The diﬀerent steps, raw key exchange,
sifting, error correction, privacy ampliﬁcation, and authentication are managed by
diﬀerent threads of QKDSequence, which allows the platform to distribute raw key
material even during the classical data processing steps.
The lengths and measured attenuations at 1310 nm and 1550 nm wavelengths of
the single mode optical ﬁbers used for the measurements are presented in Table 2.
For connecting the ﬁbers to each other and to the QKD platform, SC/PC connectors
with approximately 0.3 dB loss per connector were used. Furthermore, short SC/PC
– LC/APC ﬁbers were made using fusion splicing for compatibility with the platforms
LC/APC ports. The losses caused by the splices were negligible. Additionally, a
variable optical air gap attenuator was used to obtain additional data for loss values
that were not achievable using the available optical ﬁbers. A 2m-ﬁber with LC/APC
Table 2: Used ﬁber lengths and losses
Length [km] Loss [dB]
1.31 µm 1.55 µm
2 1.5 0.5
4 1.7 0.8
8 2.5 1.8
25(1) 8.3 4.5
25(2) 8.6 4.8
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Figure 19: System for combining the quantum and classical channels into the same
ﬁber using WDM.
Table 3: Properties of the used circulators.
Property Ports Value [dB]
CA CB
Insertion 1 → 2 0.7 0.6
Insertion 2 → 3 0.6 0.4
Isolation 2 → 1 55 59
Isolation 3 → 2 58 61
Return 51 53
connectors was used as a reference of the best possible performance, because the
loss of the ﬁber was considered negligible. Insertion losses of either platforms were
not taken into consideration, because these are inevitable and cannot be aﬀected by
the user in most cases. To make the results reﬂect the use of the QKD system in a
practical scenario and continuous operation, the system was run for at least 12 hours
in each conﬁguration, and the average value of each measured quantity was used for
the results.
As was discussed in Section 4.9, it has been demonstrated that the quantum and
classical channels required for QKD can be combined into the same optical ﬁber using
wavelength-division multiplexing. However, these experiments have been done using
costly, commercial grade components. Therefore, the feasibility of this technique in
a simple and cost-eﬀective manner using consumer grade components is also tested
in this thesis. This should also simulate a worst-case scenario where the quantum
channel shares the same ﬁber with multiple photon sources, the spectral properties
of which are not known.
The WDM system is depicted in Figure 19. The classical communication between
Alice and Bob was converted to optical signals at 1310 nm wavelength using oﬀ-the-
shelf media converters (AOA Technology AOM-3100L-S20-EA) MCA and MCB, while
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Table 4: Losses of the used WDM-modules.
Multiplexer Loss [dB]
A MUX 0.8
A DEMUX 0.3
B MUX 0.2
B DEMUX 0.8
the quantum channel was at 1550 nm, as stated above. The 1310 nm wavelength for
the classical channel was chosen in order to maximize the spectral distance between
the two channels while taking advantage of the relatively low losses of the O-band.
Furthermore, this type of conﬁguration is quite typical in older telecommunication
WDM systems, which should ensure good compatibility. The properties of the
circulators (Thorlabs CIR1310) CA and CB, used for separating the transmitted and
received classical signals, are presented in Table 3. The combination of the classical
and quantum channels into a single ﬁber was done using 2-channel WDM modules,
and the losses of these modules are presented in Table 4.
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7 Results
7.1 Performance of Clavis2
The most important ﬁgure of merit for any QKD system, the secret key rate, Rs,
is presented in Figure 20 as a function of ﬁber length for Clavis2. For distances
below 40 km, the secret key rate decreases exponentially from the maximum value of
4370 bits/s, achieved with a 2m-ﬁber, as the losses in the ﬁber reduce the amount
of pulses that reach Bob. However, when the distance is increased beyond 50 km,
the probability of Alice’s pulse being detected by Bob becomes comparable to the
probability of a dark count in Bob’s detectors, and the secret key rate drops rapidly
to zero. Due to this, 54 km was the longest ﬁber length for which key distribution
was possible with an average secret key rate of 18.7 bits/s. It should be noted that
for the ﬁrst four data points, which correspond to ﬁber lengths 2m, 2 km, 4 km, and
8 km, BB84 was used, while SARG04 was used for the rest of the ﬁber lengths due
to the automatic choice done by the software controlling the key distribution.
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Figure 20: Secret key rate of Clavis2 as a function of distance.
As can be seen in Figure 21, the quantum bit error rate of the system reﬂects
the same behaviour described above; it increases exponentially with the length of
the ﬁber as the dark counts of the detectors become more and more signiﬁcant
with higher losses in the quantum channel. The minimum QBER, reached with the
2m-ﬁber, was 1.74%. However, the most interesting point is the boundary after
which key distribution is no more possible. For Clavis2, this point was reached
between ﬁber lengths 54 km and 58 km, where the QBER values were 6.54% and
8.23%, respectively. Due to the Plug & Play implementation, the visibility of the
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system was always in the 99.0 – 99.4% range. Thus, the most signiﬁcant error source
was the detector dark counts.
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Figure 21: QBER of Clavis2 as a function of distance.
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Figure 22: Secret key rate as a function of QBER for ﬁber and attenuator.
The results above clearly demonstrate the eﬀect that the increasing QBER has
42
on the secret key rate as the length of the quantum channel increases. However, this
is not the only signiﬁcant eﬀect that determines the secret key rate in a practical
system, as can be seen from Figure 22. Here, the secret key rate of the system is
plotted as a function of the QBER separately for the cases where optical ﬁbers and
where a variable optical air gap attenuator was used. If the secret key rate depended
only on the QBER, these two curves should be identical. However, this is clearly not
the case; for the measured QBER values, the secret key rate was signiﬁcantly higher
when using an attenuator than with a ﬁber with the same QBER. Therefore, the
physical length of the ﬁber has a clear eﬀect on the secret key rate in addition to
the losses caused by the length. This is partially caused by the Plug & Play system,
since Bob has to wait after each sequence of pulses he emits for all of the pulses to
return in order to reduce errors caused by backscattering.
The maximum length of Bob’s pulse sequence in time is ld/c, where ld is the length
of Alice’s delay line and c the speed of the pulses in the quantum channel. Since
the pulses must propagate twice through the delay line and the quantum channel,
from Bob to Alice and back, the delay between Bob emitting the last pulse of a
sequence and detecting the same pulse is (2ld+2l)/c. Thus, the total length of a raw
key exchange round is (3ld + 2l)/c, and out of this Bob spends 2ld/c either emitting
or detecting photons. Therefore, the duty cycle ν of the system can be deﬁned as
ν = 2ld/(3ld + 2l). From this, one can see that, for ﬁber lengths close to 50 km, the
system spends approximately 73% of the time waiting for the pulse sequence to
return, while with an attenuator this is constant 33%. This is a clear drawback of the
Plug & Play system compared to other phase coding implementations. It should be
noted, however, that in other implementations, Alice’s and Bob’s interferometers must
be adjusted between rounds of raw key exchange, which also introduces additional
delay. This type of adjustments are not needed with Plug & Play, as was discussed
in Section 4.4.
In Figure 23, the secret key rate has been normalized with respect to the duty
cycle deﬁned above. Now there is no distinguishable diﬀerence between the secret key
rates when using optical ﬁbers and an attenuator. Thus, the diﬀerence is dominantly
caused by the duty cycle of the system.
Another phenomenon cause by high losses is that Clavis2 has to remeasure the
length of the quantum channel occasionally in order to maintain proper synchro-
nization between emitting of pulses and gating of the detectors. For example, for a
50 km-ﬁber, the length has to be measured on average once for every 20 rounds of
the raw key exchange. Furthermore, the software controlling the platform waits until
there is approximately 9× 105 bits of raw key available before error correction is
initiated. When the losses in the quantum channel are high, this accumulation of the
raw key material takes a signiﬁcant amount of time. The eﬀect of these delays and the
aforementioned duty cycle can be clearly seen in Figure 24, where the average delay
between sets of secret keys is presented as a function of the QBER. For short optical
ﬁbers, the delay is fairly constant at approximately 2min. However, when Q > 3%,
the delay increases linearly reaching a maximum of 32min with the 54 km-ﬁber. For
the attenuator, the behaviour is radically diﬀerent; for 3% < Q < 6%, the delay
increases linearly, but at a signiﬁcantly lower rate than with optical ﬁbers. For
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Figure 23: Normalized secret key rate as a function of QBER for ﬁber and attenuator.
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Figure 24: Average delay between sets of secret keys as a function of the QBER.
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example, at Q = 6%, the average delay is approximately 10min for the attenuator
and 26min for the ﬁbers. Beyond this point, the delay with the attenuator starts to
increase exponentially reaching maximum value of 21min when Q = 7.0%.
The long delay between sets of secret keys discussed above can signiﬁcantly aﬀect
the usability of the system in some practical applications. This is especially true
when the system is ﬁrst started up, since there can be up to a 30min delay before
any secret keys are available for use, if the losses in the quantum channel are high.
In the worst case, if privacy ampliﬁcation fails to produce any secret bits after the
ﬁrst round of key distribution, which occurs occasionally with high QBER values,
this time can double. Furthermore, an additional 9min start up delay is added by
the fact that Bob’s detectors must be cooled to −35 ◦C before key distribution can
begin. However, if the system is used in continuous operation and some type of key
management that takes into account the infrequency of the key sets is put in place,
these factors should not aﬀect the performance of the system in most cases.
For the hardware of the system, the longest tested time of continuous operation
was approximately 2 months. Additionally, the longest tested continuous key exchange
run was approximately four days. During these tests or any other time of normal
operation, no issues were detected with the stability of the platform. Additionally,
no user intervention was needed after starting the key distribution process.
7.2 Classical Processing
As can be seen from Figure 25, the fraction of the sifted key that is disclosed during
error correction with ID Quantique’s Cascade implementation increases linearly as
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Figure 25: Fraction of disclosed bits as a function of QBER.
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a function of the QBER. In the same ﬁgure, the so-called Shannon limit is also
presented, which deﬁnes the minimum amount of information Alice must send to
Bob per bit, and therefore disclose to Eve, for Bob to be able to correct the errors in
his key. The minimum relative diﬀerence between the disclosed bits and the Shannon
limit is reached around Q = 5.2%, where Cascade discloses 28% more bits than an
ideal error correction algorithm. On the other hand, at the last data point, where
Q = 8.3% and Cascade discloses 55% of the key, the diﬀerence has grown to 34%.
It should also be noted that, since the QBER increases exponentially as the length
of the ﬁber increases, the fraction of disclosed bits also increases exponentially with
the ﬁber length.
In Figure 26 the number of communications between Alice and Bob during error
correction, Ncom, is presented as a function of the QBER. Here, one can clearly see
the major drawback of Cascade; even when the QBER is as low as 1.7%, Cascade
still requires approximately 1600 communications to correct the errors in Bob’s sifted
key. Furthermore, for QBER values between 3.2% and 8.3%, which represent a range
of more realistic values in a practical scenario, the number of communications grows
linearly from 2300 to 6700. When this high number of communications is combined
with the amount of disclosed bits presented above, Cascade can be considered obsolete,
especially since LDPC codes can achieve better results with a single communication,
as was discussed in Section 3.1.3.
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Figure 26: Number of communications during error correction as a function of the
QBER.
In Figure 27, the fraction of bits left to the secret key after privacy ampliﬁcation
is depicted as a function of the QBER. In order to eliminate the eﬀect of the bits
disclosed during error correction, here the ﬁnal key size Nf is compared to Ns −Nd,
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Figure 27: Fraction of bits left after privacy ampliﬁcation as a function of QBER.
where Ns and Nd are the sifted key size and amount of bits disclosed by Cascade,
respectively. For ﬁber lengths of 8 km and below, where the QBER was 1.7 – 2.0%
and the used protocol was BB84, there is only a small change from 0.39 to 0.38 in the
fraction of bits left after privacy ampliﬁcation. However, for Q > 3.7%, the fraction
starts to decreases linearly from 0.32 as the QBER increases. Furthermore, privacy
ampliﬁcation produced zero secret bits in 1.7% and 6.0% of cases for ﬁber lengths
52 km and 54 km, respectively. Interestingly, when studying the raw data of these
runs as a function of time, no correlation was found between the cases where privacy
ampliﬁcation produced zero secret bits and any other relevant quantity that could
have caused this.
The average bandwidth used in the classical channel by Bob during the key
distribution is depicted in Figure 28 as a function of the ﬁber length. The bandwidth
clearly decreases exponentially with the ﬁber length from 890 kbits/s transmitted
and 70 kbits/s received measured with the 2m-ﬁber. Interestingly, the amount of
data Bob receives is over an order of magnitude smaller than how much he transmits
for all ﬁber lengths. This indicates that majority of the bandwidth is used in the
sifting phase, where Bob sends information to Alice about which photons he detected
and what were his basis choices.
Although the need for error correction increases with longer ﬁbers and higher
QBER values, which require more bandwidth in the classical channel, this is not
reﬂected by the measurement results. Instead, the used bandwidth correlates rather
well with the raw key rate and the losses in the ﬁber; with higher losses, the raw key
rate is reduced, which in turn reduces the amount of classical processing and the
used bandwidth.
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Figure 28: Use of the classical channel at Bob’s end.
7.3 Issues in Operation
Some interesting behaviour was detected, when a 2m-ﬁber was used to maximize the
raw key rate of the system, and both receiving and sending bandwidths of the classical
channel were limited in both Alice’s and Bob’s ends to 50 kbits/s. The software
managing the key distribution in Bob’s PC crashed in 98min. The bandwidth
limitation prevented the sifting of the raw keys at a higher rate than the raw key
rate, which caused the key management software to ﬁll all of the available memory
with raw key material, run out of usable RAM, and crash due to improper error
handling of std::bad_alloc. In Figure 29, the average time period for how long the
system took to crash, the crash time, tc, is presented as a function of the bandwidth
limitation B. For B ≥ 50 kbits/s, the crash time increases exponentially as the
bandwidth limitation is increased, because with the larger bandwidth the system is
able to sift some of the key raw key material and even do error correction, which
increases the time the system takes to ﬁll the RAM. Interestingly, the crash time
also increases when the bandwidth limitation approaches zero. For example, for
B = 2kbits/s, the crash time was 144min, which is signiﬁcantly longer than for the
aforementioned B = 50 kbits/s. This is caused by the fact that such a low bandwidth
started to limit even the speed of the raw key exchange, which naturally increased
the time the system took to ﬁll the RAM with the raw key material. Due to these
eﬀects, the shortest crash time was reached with the aforementioned B = 50 kbits/s.
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Figure 29: Average crash time of the system as a function of bandwidth of the
classical channel.
It could be argued that limiting the bandwidth of the classical channel to such
low values does not fairly represent any practical situation. However, since all of the
secret keys are lost in the crash and distributing new secret keys can take a signiﬁcant
amount of time, Eve could use this kind of attack to hinder the key distribution
between Alice and Bob even in cases where she does not have access to the quantum
channel. On the other hand, if she has access to the quantum channel, and she has
somehow obtained information about the initial secret used by Alice and Bob, she
could use this attack to force Alice and Bob to restart the key distribution process
giving her a window of opportunity to conduct a man-in-the-middle attack during
the ﬁrst round of key distribution, when the initial secret is used for authentication.
Lastly, even without an eavesdropper, this behaviour makes the system unstable in all
situations where the available bandwidth is below the value indicated by Figure 28.
As was mentioned earlier, the Clavis2 system must measure the physical length
of the quantum channel in order to maintain proper synchronization between the
emitting of pulses and gating of the detectors. This measurement is done when the
controlling software is started and any time the synchronisation is lost. Interestingly,
when multiple optical ﬁbers were connected together to form the quantum channel
using standard telecommunication SC/PC connectors, the system would occasionally
measure the length of the quantum channel incorrectly. In all of these cases, the
measurement recognized only some of the ﬁbers. For example, when two 25 km-ﬁbers
and one 4 km-ﬁber were used, the system would occasionally measure the length
to be 29 km, 25 km, or even 4 km. This would indicate that the error was caused
by reﬂections from the SC/PC connections. However, the return loss of all of the
connections was measured to be greater than 45 dB, which is quite typical for these
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types of connectors. This problem could probably be prevented by using only APC
connectors, but this is not always possible in practical scenarios. Therefore, giving
the user the option to input an approximate quantum channel length when the
system starts and using this information during the measurement would be the most
practical solution to the problem.
7.4 Wavelength-Division Multiplexing
Spectra of the media converters used for the wavelength-division multiplexing ex-
periments are presented in Figure 30. The main peak of the media converter A at
1308 nm is fairly close to the claimed 1310 nm, while the peak of the media converter
B is at 1318 nm. Both spectra consist of peaks with 1 nm spacing and −50 dB spectral
widths are 38 nm and 39 nm for media converters A and B, respectively.
Bob’s detectors’ noise measurements when one classical channel was multiplexed
into the same 10m-ﬁber with the quantum channel using the media converter B are
presented in Table 5. As a result, we get probabilities of detecting a photon in the
detector during a single gate when there is no quantum channel, i.e. no photons
should be detected. Separate measurements are presented for cases where the light
of the classical channel propagated from Alice to Bob, i.e. in the same direction with
a hypothetical quantum channel, and from Bob to Alice. Additionally, 10 dB and
15 dB optical attenuators were added to the output of the media converter, and Bob’s
input was ﬁltered using a 17 nm FWHM optical bandpass ﬁlter centered around the
wavelength of the quantum channel.
As could be expected, the highest amount of noise was caused by a classical
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Figure 30: Spectra of the media converters.
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Table 5: Bob’s detectors’ noise measurements.
Classical Channel Without a ﬁlter With a ﬁlter
D1 D2 D1 D2
None 8.08× 10−5 4.35× 10−5
B → A 1.43× 10−1 1.81× 10−1 1.15× 10−3 6.97× 10−4
A → B 7.13× 10−1 7.55× 10−1 1.49× 10−2 7.02× 10−3
B → A, 10 dB 7.52× 10−3 1.13× 10−2 1.40× 10−4 6.98× 10−5
A → B, 10 dB 6.33× 10−2 9.90× 10−2 5.87× 10−4 4.04× 10−4
B → A, 15 dB 4.01× 10−3 2.97× 10−3 1.08× 10−4 5.82× 10−5
A → B, 15 dB 3.78× 10−2 2.34× 10−2 3.52× 10−4 2.90× 10−4
channel that propagated to the same direction with the quantum channel when
no ﬁltering or attenuation was used. In this case, there was a 71% probability of
detecting a photon in detector 1 and 76% in detector 2. Since the photon detectors are
gated at 5MHz, this corresponds to an optical power of approximately 5× 10−12 W,
if the quantum eﬃciency of the detectors is assumed to be 10%. This explains why
the power is not detectable in the spectrum of Figure 30, where the noise ﬂoor of
the spectrum analyzer limited the lowest detectable power to 10−6 mW. This noise
is approximately four orders of magnitude larger than without multiplexing, where
the noise levels were 8.1× 10−5 and 4.4× 10−5 for detectors 1 and 2, respectively.
Interestingly, if the classical channel is reversed to propagate from Bob to Alice, the
noise is reduced by 75–80%. Furthermore, adding the bandpass ﬁlter to Bob’s input
reduced the noise even more signiﬁcantly, by two orders of magnitude.
Unsurprisingly, adding a 10 dB attenuator to the output of the media converter
further reduced the noise levels by one order of magnitude, and a 15 dB attenuator by
additional 47–76%. Using a 20 dB attenuator was also tested. However, the media
converter did not function under such high losses. Thus, the lowest noise levels were
achieved by setting the direction of the classical channel to be from Bob to Alice,
attenuating the classical channel by 15 dB and using the optical ﬁlter at Bob’s input.
With this conﬁguration, the noise levels were 1.1× 10−4 and 5.8× 10−5 for detectors
1 and 2, respectively, which is a 34% increase for both detectors compared to the
noise without multiplexing. However, if the entire classical channel was multiplexed
into the same ﬁber with the quantum channel, the noise would clearly be dominated
by the light propagating from Alice to Bob. Therefore, the noise levels 3.5× 10−4
and 2.9× 10−4 are a better ﬁgure of merit in a practical situation.
Although the ﬁltering and attenuating reduced the amount of noise quite close
to the values achieved without multiplexing when the classical channel was set to
propagate from Bob to Alice, the key distribution was not possible even with this
conﬁguration, because the QBER was approximately 12%. Since the additional
noise in the detectors caused by the classical channel can be considered eﬀectively as
additional dark counts, this increase of the QBER cannot be caused by the noise
alone, as can be seen from Equation (34). Furthermore, changing the direction of
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the classical channel caused the length measurement of the quantum channel to be
impossible, which prevented even starting of the key distribution. Therefore, using
the system of Figure 19 for combining the classical and quantum channels into a
single ﬁber is not feasible with the chosen components. Additionally, these results
clearly demonstrate the challenges in combining quantum and any classical signals
into the same ﬁber; due to the drastically diﬀerent optical power levels, the isolation
between quantum and classical channels has to be orders of magnitude greater than
in ordinary WDM applications.
Since the addition of the bandpass ﬁlter to Bob’s input improved the noise
measurements of the detectors by almost two orders of magnitude in all cases in
Table 5, the results could be further improved signiﬁcantly, if a ﬁlter with a narrower
passband was used either at Bob’s input port or at the output of the media converter.
Alternatively, a probably more eﬀective solution would be to use media converters with
signiﬁcantly narrower spectra. However, both of these solutions would signiﬁcantly
reduce the cost-eﬀectiveness of the system, which was one of the main objectives.
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8 Conclusion
The main objective of this thesis was to assess whether quantum key distribution is
applicable to practical applications at its current state. In addition to security, the
most important criteria for this were set to be performance, stability, and usability.
All of these criteria were tested using one of the few commercially available QKD
platforms, ID Quantique’s Clavis2.
The highest achieved key rate with the tested QKD platform was 4370 bits/s with
a 2m optical ﬁber. The longest ﬁber length for which the platform was able to provide
secret keys was 54 km. At this distance, the average secret key rate was 18.7 bits/s.
Whether these rates are suﬃcient for practical applications, depends highly on the
desired level of security, one-time pad representing the best level possible. For
distances well below 50 km, the provided secret key rate may be adequate for basic
communication using OTP. However, if distances close to 50 km or high data rates
are desired, more advanced ciphers remain as the only option; even the 18.7 bits/s
secret key rate is suﬃcient to change a 256-bit AES key every 14 seconds.
Like with most discrete variable QKD systems, the most limiting factor of Clavis2
are the photon detectors; dark counts limit the maximum distance, and after pulses
limit the maximum raw key rate. Furthermore, the implemented protocols, BB84
and SARG04, are not as robust against the PNS attack as many newer protocols,
which limits the maximum distance even further. Lastly, the Cascade error correction
algorithm can be considered obsolete, since more eﬃcient protocols that require less
interactivity have been demonstrated.
The tested QKD platform was stable during normal operation for long periods of
time and did not require any intervention from the user during operation. However,
it was observed that limiting the bandwidth of the classical channel makes the system
unstable. This is caused by the managing software running out of usable memory
and improper error handling. Furthermore, when the quantum channel consisted of
multiple optical ﬁbers connected with SC/PC connectors, the system was occasionally
unable to measure the length of the quantum channel correctly, preventing the key
distribution from starting. This eﬀect was especially prominent with long ﬁbers and
high losses. Fortunately, both of the observed problems could be ﬁxed by modifying
the software.
In its current state, QKD can be considered a mature technology that can provide
provably secure communication within the limitations presented above. However,
since this provable security is the strength of QKD compared to the alternatives,
further development is needed to achieve secret key rates suﬃcient for encryption
using OTP at modern data rates.
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